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ABSTRACT
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was a central figure in the FDR
administration in more than just fiscal matters. Morgenthau also worked from the 1930’s
onward in several arenas to aid the Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust. My research
updates and revises the existing historiography by revealing this activism was the logical
culmination of years of interest in the fates of Jewish refugees. Furthermore, this
activism was affected by several factors beyond Morgenthau’s own control. The
administrative style of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, relationships between
Morgenthau and other members of the cabinet, and influential undercurrents within the
cabinet all limited Morgenthau’s options for rescue and helped determine the outcomes of
his actions on behalf of refugees. While Morgenthau has often been a neglected
character in the history books, this thesis places him at the center. In doing so, I argue
that his involvement both came earlier than most historians assert, and was influenced by
factors that have not been previously analyzed as they apply to Morgenthau’s particular
historical situation.
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General Introduction

Henry Morgenthau, Jr. had a difficult job in a difficult time, and for many people
that would have been enough, but he was also a man with a mission. Part I of this thesis
will demonstrate Morgenthau’s progression of ideas and the logical sequence of events
that propelled Morgenthau from simply being Roosevelt’s friend in the Treasury toward
becoming a champion of the Jewish people. Additionally, Part II dares to ask why these
events unfolded as they did, and explores possible answers to that question, such as the
administrative style of FDR and interpersonal dynamics within the cabinet. While
Morgenthau has often been a very neglected character in the history books, only
mentioned alongside economic details or the War Refugee Board, this thesis places him
at the center. Shown as they evolved through time, Morgenthau’s actions and words
demonstrated his original confidence that the government would care for refugees, his
subsequent loss of faith in that system, and his eventual personal activism, culminating in
his work with the United Jewish Appeal and the creation of the State of Israel. These
actions and outcomes were not random—they were subtly and overtly directed and
limited by powerful institutional cultures and interpersonal forces within the FDR
administration.
During World War II, Morgenthau made every effort to aid and relieve the Jews
of Europe, using his position as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Secretary of the
Treasury to raise awareness and generate results. Most significantly, he is credited with
the 1944 creation of the War Refugee Board that saved 250,000 human lives. Postwar,
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Morgenthau worked for the creation of the State of Israel, continuing his personal
activism on behalf of the surviving European Jewish remnant. In the area of finance,
Morgenthau was responsible for the postwar economic world order centered on the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund that dominated through the 1960’s and is
still influential today. Despite his achievements, he is often a secondary character in the
history books, again, mentioned only briefly alongside the creation of the War Refugee
Board or within the minutiae of economics and finance. This thesis gives Morgenthau
the time and consideration his unique historical situation merits; it will illuminate his
continual work on behalf of the Jewish refugees who were victims of the Nazis’
Holocaust.

BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

It is helpful to outline Morgenthau’s life with a brief biographical sketch before
proceeding further. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was born on May 11, 1891, in New York
City. His grandfather had emigrated from Germany and had become a successful
diplomat, culminating his career with an ambassadorship to Turkey. Young Henry
attended private schools, including Cornell University; he did not graduate, but left
school early, turning to his dairy and fruit farm in Dutchess County, New York.
Morgenthau’s farm was fifteen miles from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s home in Hyde Park,
and it was there that the two began the friendship that would endure throughout their
lives. During this time, Morgenthau became quite the agriculturalist; his heart was in
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farming and he was even the publisher of The American Agriculturalist from 1922 until
1933. He also became an established member of Roosevelt’s political entourage, and
served under him when FDR became Governor of New York. He would rise to national
prominence in FDR’s presidential administration.
The U.S. Treasury’s biography of Morgenthau perfectly encapsulates his early
political career in the 1930’s. After “Having served as head of the Farm Credit
administration in 1933, Henry Morgenthau was appointed Secretary of the Treasury by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934,” and “As Roosevelt’s Secretary, Morgenthau
was instrumental in setting up the Works Progress Administration and the Public Works
of Art Project in the 1930’s.” During World War II, Morgenthau initiated the system of
marketing War Bonds that raised forty-nine million dollars during the war, and also
administered Lend-Lease. On a fundamental level, Morgenthau was the man most
responsible for making sure that the checks of the most powerful country in the world
didn’t bounce during the largest war in world history to date. As Secretary of the
Treasury, Morgenthau helped to create the economic world order that still exists today
when he established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition to
fulfilling his immense responsibilities in the arena of U.S. and world finance,
Morgenthau also found time to facilitate the organized Jewish community’s rescue efforts
for refugees from his position in the treasury. While he had a been a donor to the United
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Jewish appeal since the 1930’s, after the war Morgenthau actively devoted his life to
philanthropy, working with the organization for the creation of the State of Israel. 1

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

Morgenthau’s story is indeed significant and one might expect to find it fully
documented and explored within the existing historiography. For, historians and other
scholars have devoted enormous efforts to documenting and analyzing the events and
implications of the Holocaust, from the smallest details to large-scale structural analysis.
During this critical period of world history, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was the highestranking Jewish official in the government of the most powerful country in the world, and
he made significant contributions of time, effort, and money to save the victims of Nazi
genocide. However, in a historical field that is thoroughly saturated with monographs,
edited volumes, documentary collections, and articles covering everything from central
events to tangential minutiae, there is a comparative dearth of information about
Morgenthau. The vast majority of the existing historiography relegates him to snippets or
footnotes, and even the most generous monographs rarely devote more than a few
paragraphs. This thesis will present a more complete picture of Morgenthau’s interest

1

For more biographical information on Morgenthau, see Morgenthau, Henry III, Mostly
Morgenthau’s: A Family History, (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1991); Blum, John Morton,
From The Morgenthau Diaries, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959-67); quote from the U.S.
Treasury’s brief biographical sketch, located on the world wide web at
http://www.treas.gov/education/history/sereatries/hmorgenthaujr.shtml ; for a useful and concise
summary see Webster, Merriam Co., “Henry Morgenthau, Jr.” in Webster’s American
Biographies.

Yancey 5
and involvement in the refugee issue, and will give him the historical consideration his
considerable actions merit.
While much of Holocaust and World War II historiography alluded to above
relegates Morgenthau to the fringes, Yehuda Bauer’s American Jewry and the Holocaust
is especially negligent. Bauer mentions Morgenthau on only three pages and neglects
even to tell readers that Morgenthau is Jewish. This follows the prevailing judgment of
many scholars focusing on the organized Jewish community; many are convicted that
Morgenthau somehow was not “Jewish enough.” Perhaps this is why so many scholars
slight him. In Bauer’s work, there is one sentence about Morgenthau’s raising awareness
of Jews in Algiers in 1942, and he is mentioned on 2 pages in the chapter on the Joint
Distribution Committee and the War Refugee Board. Bauer snubs Morgenthau and gives
his staff sole credit for the creation of the War Refugee Board. Bauer does this by
arguing they prepared “a dossier on the attitude of the State department … and a reluctant
Morgenthau was slowly convinced that drastic measures were needed.” Bauer (along
with other notable scholars) ignores substantial documentary evidence of Morgenthau’s
early involvement in the refugee issue. My research reveals that Morgenthau was not
reluctant to act; on the contrary, he entered the fray as soon as he became fully aware of
the State Department’s failure to do the job assigned to it. 2
In contrast to Bauer is Saul Friedman’s A History of the Holocaust. Despite the
book’s broad scope, Friedman mentions Morgenthau on several pages, noting
Morgenthau is an influential Jewish leader who helped create the War Refugee Board.
2

Quote from Bauer, Yehuda, American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee 1939-1945, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), p. 401.
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Ironically, Friedman’s overarching synthesis spares more time for Morgenthau than
Bauer’s study of the organized American (mostly northeastern) Jewish Community.
Because of the expansive scope of Friedman’s work, there is a great deal of pertinent
detail that it obviously cannot cover. 3
The Politics of Rescue, by Henry Feingold, devotes more attention to Morgenthau.
Feingold highlights Morgenthau’s personal agency in making FDR aware of problems in
the State Department. Feingold notes that “not until…Morgenthau…was activated in the
rescue effort was a countervailing source of information made available to [FDR] from
within the administration.” However, like Friedman and Bauer, Feingold argues that
Morgenthau’s involvement came late; Feingold says that even as late as 1942
Morgenthau was only “beginning to show interest in the refugee program.” Again, what
makes this statement possible is that Feingold does not utilize the documents that show
Morgenthau’s involvement from the 1930’s. 4
In 1987, Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut published the seminal work American
Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945. They provide a clear and concise
description of Morgenthau’s involvement with the Reigner Plan to save Romanian Jews.
Breitman and Kraut, in contrast to Bauer’s snub, see Morgenthau as influential in the
events leading up to the creation of the War Refugee Board. Once or twice, the authors
hint at earlier involvement, but they do not fully explore the issue. 5

3

Freidman, Saul, A History of the Holocaust, (Mitchell Valentine and Company, 2004).
Quotes from Feingold, Henry, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the
Holocaust, 1938-1945, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), p. 145, 170.
5
Breitman, Richard, and Kraut, Alan, Refugee Policy and European Jewry, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987).
4
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In addition to the general studies of Holocaust history that mention Morgenthau at
a few crucial moments, there is some literature devoted solely to studying him. Of these
volumes, the definitive work is the august John Morton Blum’s three-part series, From
the Morgenthau Diaries. Blum draws from roughly six hundred volumes of documents
Morgenthau took with him after leaving office—the “Morgenthau Diaries” themselves.
While Blum’s work is comprehensive, it is not exhaustive. His coverage of
Morgenthau’s work to aid refugees appears in twenty pages in Volume Three. Like that
of many other historians, it focuses almost exclusively on the events leading up to the
creation of the War Refugee Board, and some of its subsequent action. 6
Another book that devotes substantial attention Morgenthau is The Conquerors,
by Michael Beschloss. Beschloss analyzes the relationship between President Roosevelt
and Morgenthau, portraying Morgenthau as a key player in the administration who
usually has an axe to grind. While he sees Morgenthau as an important figure in the
administration, Beschloss takes a critical view of Morgenthau. For example, his
discussion of the Morgenthau Plan for Postwar Germany is condemning; Morgenthau had
hoped to rid the country of all weapons and factories and revert Germany to a purely
agricultural state. More troubling, like Blum, Beschloss presents Morgenthau’s refugee
work as occurring reluctantly, coming late in the war and only at the insistence of John
Pehle. 7

6

For more detail on Blum’s coverage of the refugee issue see Blum, John Morton, From the
Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941-1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 207-227.

7

Beschloss, Michael, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the Destruction of
Hitler’s Germany, 1941-1945, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
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In addition to the work of such notable historians, several members of the
Morgenthau family have contributed to the dialogue through memoirs and other works.
For example, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the
First World War, wrote several volumes about his own life and work, including
Ambassador Morgenthau's Story and I Was Sent to Athens. Foreshadowing his son’s
work, Morgenthau Sr. documents his efforts to help the victims of the Armenian
Genocide. In 1947, Henry Morgenthau Jr. published his six-part “Morgenthau Diaries”
in Collier’s magazine with preeminent historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. acting as a
ghostwriter. Additionally, Morgenthau, Jr. wrote Germany is Our Problem, a rather
badly received book detailing his now-infamous “Morgenthau Plan” for the
reconstruction (or, in this case deconstruction) of Germany. Moving forward into the
next generation, Henry Morgenthau III added Mostly Morgenthaus to the literature, and it
is this book that delves most deeply into his father’s refugee work. Since he is writing a
family history, Morgenthau III devotes much of his time to offering unique insights into
his father’s personality. He presents a richly detailed portrait of his father as a man and
public official. Interestingly, he provides a complicated psychological profile of his
father as someone who was deeply concerned for refugees, but did not want to appear
“too Jewish” or extreme in his efforts. However, beyond the valuable personal insights
and gripping family history it offers, Mostly Morgenthaus generally follows the trajectory
established by professional historians, for example, by maintaining that Morgenthau’s
involvement in the issue came late. 8

8

Morgenthau, Henry, I Was Sent to Athens, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, and Company,
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Complementing and informing this historiography is a great deal of literature that
is primarily concerned with understanding the failure of the free world to rescue the Jews
(and often assigning blame). This is a hotly contested terrain, and one of the central
arguments in this field surrounds the question of how much the U.S. government actually
knew about the Holocaust while it was happening. This issue persistently resists
categorical certainty, but it is clear that the U.S. government to some extent repressed
information and often failed to act on that information they had. However, some major
strains of thought amounting to a rough consensus are worth considering.
One of the primary proponents of American guilt is Arthur D. Morse, whose book
While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy argues exactly what the title
implies. Morse harshly condemns the U.S. government for its failure to act on what he
argues was full knowledge of the Holocaust while it was happening. Morse partially
blames Roosevelt, and absolutely implicates the State Department. However, he praises
Morgenthau for his role in highlighting State Department obstructions to the rescue
effort. 9
David Wyman’s enormous work on the Holocaust is meticulously documented
and richly detailed, but it also assigns a great deal of blame. It is almost as though
Wyman would argue that people like FDR and Churchill were accomplices to Nazi

inc., 1929); Morgenthau, Henry, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1918); Morgenthau Jr., Henry, Germany is our problem, (New
York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1945); Morgenthau, Henry III, Mostly Morgenthaus: A
Family History (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1991); Morgenthau, Henry Jr., “Morgenthau
Diaries,” in Collier’s magazine, 1947.
9
Morse, Arthur D., While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy, (New York:
Random House, 1968).
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atrocity, simply because they did not possess the omnipotence that would have been
required to stop it any earlier than they did. 10
Richard Breitman’s Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British
and Americans Knew is more nuanced. Breitman addresses the American difficulty in
believing what news did reach their ears; this reluctance was partly fueled by botched
reports of atrocities in World War I. He includes several invaluable pages highlighting
Morgenthau’s response to learning the extent of Nazi atrocity and State Department
inaction surrounding the issue of Romanian Jews. Breitman noted:
He [Morgenthau] had encouraged Roosevelt to pursue refugee initiatives
in 1938-39, but he had not done much since the war began…[and] in
1943, Morgenthau had already begun to take an interest in rescue and
relief procedures, then his subordinates accelerated his progress.
Otherwise, Breitman generally agrees with the prevailing views in the historiography.
However, he does not assign Morgenthau enough credit in the intervening years. 11
In Auschwitz and the Allies, Martin Gilbert deals with Morgenthau almost
exclusively in the context of the War Refugee Board. While he gives Morgenthau a great
deal of credit for its creation, he also points out that it was politically expedient for FDR
to create the Board, both to placate Congress and secure the Jewish vote. Gilbert further
highlights several other plans that were considered for rescue, such as bombing

10

See Wyman, David, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945;
Wyman, David A Race Against Death: Peter Bergsen, America, and the Holocaust, (New York:
New Press, W.W. Norton, 2002); Wyman, David America and the Holocaust.
11
Quote from Breitman Richard, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and
Americans Knew, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), p. 198.
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Auschwitz. Gilbert argues that the Allies failed to do all that they could have because of
a failure of imagination, coordination, initiative, and at times sympathy. 12
To summarize, the common historiographical focus on Morgenthau’s role in the
creation of the War Refugee Board leaves the impression that this was the beginning of
his activism. Such a focus implies that he was previously less aware of the plight of
European Jews, or at least less active in supporting them. While the historiography
discussed is very valuable, it presents an incomplete picture; this leaves open the
challenge of analyzing Morgenthau’s actual involvement, his significant role in the
refugee crisis. Part one of thesis will begin to fill in the gaps in the historiography,
demonstrating that Morgenthau had been concerned and involved from very early. Part
Two will continue this idea and further it by asking why events unfolded as they did, and
taking a look at some of the administrative, structural, and relational factors that bore a
profound influence on the situation in its entirety.

12

Gilbert, Martin, Auschwitz and the Allies: A Devastating Account of How the Allies Responded
to the News of Hitler’s Mass Murder, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1981).
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Part One:
The Path to Activism

Yancey 13

Part One:
The Path To Activism
Just a few days after Kristallnacht (November 9-10, 1938) Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
called his friend Franklin D. Roosevelt to bend his ear about refugees and to offer
constructive ideas for rescue. Obviously, FDR was determined to help the would-be
victims of Nazi atrocity; as Frank Ninkovich argues in The Wilsonian Century,
Kristallnacht convinced FDR that liberalism, appeasement, and diplomacy alone were
not going to work in the long run, and Roosevelt was determined both to educate the
American public and to prevent Nazi conquest of the world. Obviously, FDR was
involved; in fact, “involved” might possibly be the understatement of the century.
However, Morgenthau is another story. Historians often argue that Morgenthau did not
enter into the refugee issue until very late, and they make little effort to analyze why.
Often, they simply assert that he was previously uninterested in the fates of refugees. It is
true that Morgenthau appears to be less active on the refugee front during the period from
1941-1942, especially immediately after Pearl Harbor. Perhaps this was because the
government had already begun to prepare for the anticipated war. Roosevelt had
requested $1.3 billion for defense in May of 1940, and in June of 1940 he ordered the
War Department to give Britain $43 million in military stocks. By January of 1941,
Morgenthau had begun drafting Lend-Lease legislation. There was a great deal to
prepare and launch: military financing, defense contracts, economic sanctions on Japan,
increased aid to allies, and stimulating wartime production, just to name a few
monumental tasks. Indeed, the Second World War was really beginning in earnest for
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America, and the whole government was caught up in a magnificent flurry of activity to
mobilize the country. Given Morgenthau’s involvement in the refugee issue prior to
Pearl Harbor and his reentry into the fray after a short period, it is unlikely that he was
unconcerned during 1941. The Secretary of the Treasury was clearly a very busy man.
He was doing his job, and I argue that during the early war years he hoped and assumed
that since Roosevelt had placed the State Department in charge of refugee affairs, State
would do its job. Morgenthau continued to work with State on the refugee issue where
there were overlaps in jurisdiction, but Morgenthau was by necessity consumed with
financing the war effort. However, in late 1943, when Morgenthau finally became fully
aware of the State Department’s failures, he would take matters into his own hands and
help effect significant changes. 13

THE STRUCTURE OF EVENTS

At the beginning of U.S. involvement in the refugee issue in the 1930’s,
Morgenthau was quite optimistic. Like the rest of the country, he watched the escalating

13

See Ninkovich, Frank, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900, (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 122-123; For a typical example of prevailing
historiography on Morgenthau’s late entry see Feingold, Henry, Bearing Witness: How America
and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust, (Syracuse, NY.: Syracuse University Press 1995),
175,251; For an example of Morgenthau’s early involvement see Morgenthau, Henry Jr., The
Morgenthau Diaries: Depression and the New Deal 1933-1939, (Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, NY: University Publications of America, 1995), text-fiche, v. 151, pp. 32-34;
see Davis, Kenneth, FDR: The War President, 92-93 for Lend-Lease’s beginnings; For
Morgenthau’s reaction to State Department incompetence see Breitman, Official Secrets, p. 198;
For the flurry of planning surrounding Pearl Harbor, see Utley, Jonathan, Going to War With
Japan, and Davis, Kenneth, FDR: The War President, 19, 275,
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crisis in Europe with apprehension, and for Morgenthau, along with many others,
Kristallnacht was a crucial moment; it was an undeniable call to action. In the first of
many proposed solutions for refugees, Morgenthau agreed with Dr. Isaiah Bowman,
President of Johns Hopkins University and government advisor on refugees, that refugee
colonies should be established in Central America. In fact, Morgenthau encouraged
Roosevelt to create such a colony. His tone when discussing these issues in 1938 is very
positive, but it gradually darkens. 14
Morgenthau’s early attitude is discernible in the documents detailing the
unsuccessful attempt to rescue the refugees on the SS Saint Louis in 1939. After
Kristallnacht, many German Jews felt the pressing need for emigration, and many of
these refugees had obtained papers that would allow them to emigrate to Cuba. However,
once they reached its shores, the Cuban government denied their entry; it wanted five
hundred dollars per refugee, and the Joint Distribution Committee had only planned for
one fifth of what was needed. They acquired the money, but it was a few hours after the
Cuban President’s arbitrary deadline for its arrival. Tragically, it was a deadline he had
not made them aware of. The U.S. government could have saved the passengers onboard,
but the State Department proved to be unwilling to accomplish the finagling of
immigration law that would have been required to do so. Indeed, it was a hopelessly
complicated issue, plagued with unclear lines of responsibility and oppressively
restrictive immigration law. However, the State Department denied visas to these

14

For Morgenthau’s early optimism see Morgenthau, Depression and the New Deal, v. 152, p.
70.

Yancey 16
refugees despite considerable efforts from the organized Jewish community—and support
from the government and the fact that rescuing people would have been possible with a
little creative wrangling around existing law. When this became apparent, it must have
planted seeds of doubt in Morgenthau’s mind about State’s willingness to help. 15
However, Morgenthau knew that not everyone in State was opposed to refugees.
Another person who was interested in their welfare was Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles, a dapper, blue-blooded graduate of Groton and Harvard. Welles was a key figure
in the Roosevelt administration, as he had been the primary architect of the Good
Neighbor Policy and had drafted the Atlantic Charter. Regarding refugees, in 1938,
Welles had eagerly worked with Morgenthau and Bowman on the attempt to create a
refugee colony in Latin America. Significantly, Welles had also tried to relax
immigration laws in 1938, but opposition from his own department largely curtailed his
efforts. In fact, the Evian Conference was partly his idea; in March, Welles went to
Roosevelt and recommended that he “get out front and attempt to guide” on the refugee
issue. The conference quickly came together. Despite Evian’s failure to change
conditions significantly, FDR and Welles had at least started the ball rolling to create the
governmental machinery that could help Holocaust refugees. It is significant that later on
Welles would be the person who finally gave full disclosure about the Holocaust to Rabbi
Wise and other members of the organized Jewish community, going over the head of

15

For more on the S.S. Saint Louis see Morse, Arthur, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of
American Apathy, (Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 1998), 270-288; Thomas,
Gordon, and Max Morgan Witts, Voyage of the Damned, (New York: Stein and Day, 1974); see
also http://www.jewishvirtuallibray.org/jsource/Holocaust/stlouis.html
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Breckinridge Long and his staff. However, that is not to imply that Welles was a model
of perfection himself. Despite the fact that Welles was sympathetic to their desperate
situation, he to some extent feared a large influx of refugees because they mostly fell into
the category of “enemy alien” immigrants, because they were coming from hostile
countries. Indeed, the American government and general population harbored
Xenophobia and a fairly pervasive fear of Nazi subterfuge. It was arguably a very real
threat, and Welles, like FDR, was not immune to the threat of the Fifth Column.
However, Welles, again like FDR, had a deeply rooted humanitarian impulse to help the
European refugees who suffered and died under Hitler. 16
Whereas Welles empathized with would-be Holocaust victims, Breckinridge
Long, the man who was actually in charge of refugee affairs, stood out in cold contrast.
His documented anti-Semitism lent him a condemnable detachment from the issue;
instead of doing the job that FDR had given him, Long would purposefully squander the
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opportunity to help even those few who could be saved. On June 26, Long sent out a
memorandum detailing his insidious plan to cut off immigration. Long wrote, “We can
delay and effectively stop for a temporary period of indefinite length the number of
immigrants to the United States. We could do this by simply advising our consuls to put
every obstacle in the way and to require additional evidence and to resort to various
administrative devices which would postpone and postpone the granting of the visas.”
Heavily cloaked in the rhetoric of fear of spies and sabotage, his policies were
implemented. It is clear that despite all evidence to the contrary, Long considered
himself to be a holy defender of America; he styled himself as a guardian of the gates,
“keeping the faith” and protecting the country. He was unconcerned that his actions
might violate both treaty laws and the humanity of the American government. During
1940, U.S. consuls abroad were universally advised to withhold visas even from those
who qualified for them under the ridiculously strenuous new requirements; the slightest
shadow of a doubt about anything was cause for refusal. Only a negligible number of
people slipped through the tight net Long had cast; with requirements like a character
reference from the Gestapo, who could possibly succeed? 17
In 1941, the State Department, and especially Breckinridge Long, further
tightened immigration laws. After 1942, as the United States Government became more
aware of the extent and horrific nature of Nazi oppression and murder, Morgenthau
increased his efforts. In 1943, Morgenthau grew increasingly disenchanted where he had
17
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once been confident in the ability of government agencies to work together to help the
innocent victims of the Nazis. Cordell Hull, who had tried to be helpful in the beginning,
was now suffering from chronic tuberculosis to the extent that he was coughing blood
into his handkerchief. That coupled with his diabetes was apparently enough to render
him completely unaware that Breckinridge Long, the very man in charge of refugee
affairs, was sabotaging their rescue. 18
Again, in denying entry to refugees, Long claimed to be protecting the country
from the ominous threat of infiltration by Nazi spies. It was a gripping fear, and Long
wrote in June of 1940 that “It is very apparent that the Germans are using visitor’s visas
to send agents and documents through the United States,” and it must be said that Long
was not alone in it. Indeed, there was a pervasive atmosphere of paranoia in the State
Department dating back to the 1930’s that will be explored in Part Two. However, Long
presented a particularly disturbing case, for his fear of refugees was at least partially
motivated by his rabid anti-Semitism, not to mention his nativist, Xenophobic tendencies.
In fact, Long’s own War Diary betrayed his prejudicial views and actions quite clearly.
The examples are numerous; for example, Long’s language when discussing refugees
was dispassionate and condescending. At one point he actually went so far as to label the
American public’s concern for British refugee children “an enormous psychosis.”
Consequently, he proved unwilling to help even when it was possible to do so. In
September of 1940, Long worried that allowing a boatload of Jewish refugees from
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Lisbon to land on U.S. soil “would be a violation of the spirit of the law if not the letter.”
Long further announced that he “would not be party to it,” and although he cloaked his
bigotry with concern for immigration law and fearful rhetoric about spies, it seems as
though Long believed that the real tragedy would be allowing more Jews to enter
America. Upon reading his War Diary, it is clear that the Holocaust was irrelevant to
Long; at the very least, death camps and the widespread human suffering they massproduced were beneath his radar. In January of 1941, Long recorded an issue over the
quota system his diary; he found nothing wrong with requiring emigrant Jews to furnish a
record of good character from the Gestapo. Perhaps Long failed to comprehend the
Nazis’ poisonous ideology, limitless persecution, and mass murder; it is perhaps more
likely that his anti-Semitism rendered him blithely unconcerned with the fates of their
chosen victims. However, it would be unfair to equate Long in particular with the State
Department in general. He was a huge part of the problem, but he did not represent its
totality. Hull, for one, was fairly ignorant of Long’s behavior. He was often out of the
Cabinet loop and it is evident from Cordell Hull’s statements in his Memoirs that despite
all evidence against them Hull continued to believe the best of his subordinates
(including Long) until the end of his life. 19
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Even at a glance, it is clear that Morgenthau faced incredibly numerous obstacles
to saving the Jews. His optimism about rescue and his faith in the system diminished
rapidly as he realized that key State Department officials were purposefully negligent,
and governmental rescue efforts were largely failing. John Pehle, Assistant to the
Secretary, and Randolph Paul, General Counsel for the Treasury, were instrumental in
effecting this change in Morgenthau’s consciousness. As the evidence mounted, it
became patently obvious that internal issues made the State Department unreliable. 20
In 1943, during an attempt to save Romanian Jews, Morgenthau realized that the
burden of rescue was on his own shoulders. Subsequently, he and his staff rose to the
occasion. A few key members of his staff, Pehle, Paul, and Josiah DuBois (another
Assistant to the Secretary), drafted the Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of
This Government in the Murder of the Jews for Morgenthau to take to President
Roosevelt. Because of Roosevelt’s willingness to break with tradition and forge new
pathways in the Presidency, a remarkable thing occurred. A few days later on January
22, 1944, Roosevelt issued Executive Order Number 9417, creating the War Refugee
Board. What some have termed Roosevelt’s rather “imperial” presidency in fact had
created precedents within the administration for Roosevelt to do this; the President often
acted by Executive Order. After its creation, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of
the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Secretary of War Henry Stimson worked
see Breitman, Richard and Kraut, Alan M, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933 –
1945, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1987), 145.
20
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together on the War Refugee Board to accomplish the goal of saving the Jews of
Europe. 21
Postwar, Morgenthau continued along the path he had chosen back in 1938; he
would aid the refugees. Afterward, instead of dreaming of a refugee colony in Costa
Rica, Morgenthau worked for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This was
no great departure from his past; Zionism had been a recurring topic in Morgenthau’s
correspondence for many years. Since the 1930’s, Morgenthau had also been a
contributor to the Joint Distribution Committee, which provided immeasurable aid to
refugees and saved many would-be victims of the Holocaust. He had worked closely
with numerous private Jewish aid organizations during the war, and his postwar work for
the United Jewish Appeal appeared a very logical step. Morgenthau quickly transitioned
from working with the government to working with the United Jewish Appeal, becoming
general chairman in 1946 and spearheading several enormous fundraising campaigns that
garnered millions of dollars for their cause. UJA officials later said that the success of
the fundraising campaign had depended on Morgenthau’s involvement. In this way,
Morgenthau was instrumental in the creation of the State of Israel.22
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The primary sources represented here demonstrate Henry Morgenthau, Jr.’s
evolution of thought and action in reference to refugees and Jewish victims of the
Holocaust. The documents discussed are representative of many more like them, but they
are featured because they demonstrate Morgenthau’s history in a clear and concise way.
They are drawn largely from the Morgenthau Diaries on microfilm, the Cordell Hull and
Henry Stimson papers on Microfilm, and the Morgenthau Papers housed in the Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Library. Here, Part I progresses chronologically, beginning with 1938
and culminating in the late 1940’s. Part Two will delve into the relationships that
influenced and affected this chronology. As Morgenthau’s personal trajectory often
reflects key events and milestones of a larger significance, relevant historical material is
presented simultaneously within the documentary chronology.
It is important to note that Henry Morgenthau, Jr. left reams of documents behind
him during his tenure of office as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury.
Boxes upon boxes, thousands upon thousands of pages await the researcher who would
explore Morgenthau’s career. This may seem daunting, but fortunately, Secretary
Morgenthau saved everything; he was impressively organized and he had a magnificent
secretary to help him. While there really is a seemingly endless array of possibilities for
research, this essay focuses on the particular moments represented in documents that
crystallize Morgenthau’s outlook, capture turning points, or witness him taking a stand.
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MORGENTHAU AND THE REFUGEES: TELLING THE STORY

When did this stance on refugees first appear in the documents? In other words,
how soon after the refugee crisis became apparent did Morgenthau become involved, in
one way or another, with the issue? The documents in his diary demonstrate that
Morgenthau was from the late 1930’s onward growing increasingly concerned for
refugees and taking significant steps toward a solution.
The crisis arose when on January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of
Germany. Less than 2 months later, Hitler imprisoned 4800 of his political opponents at
Dachau. In April, the Nazis boycotted Jewish-owned shops in Germany and by
September they outlawed Jewish landownership. In 1935, the Nuremberg laws stripped
Jews of citizenship; afterward, oppression increased almost daily. By the time of the
1938 Anschluss, or annexation of Austria, conditions were such that U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt began pressuring for an international conference on refugees.
Following the March 12, 1938 Anschluss, within two weeks the United States
Government stepped into the ring. 23
On March 23, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles sent Secretary Morgenthau
a warm letter including a packet of information about what the government was doing.
From this letter, Morgenthau learned that Welles was working to consolidate the German
and Austrian immigration quotas so that refugees from Austria would be able to enter the
23
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country along with their German counterparts. Welles also enclosed copies of two of the
urgent telegrams Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent on the 22nd to all of the American
republics and the United States’ European allies requesting an intergovernmental
committee on refugees. Hull’s telegram to the American Embassy in Argentina opened
with an appeal to tradition:
This Government, in the light of its tradition of welcoming refugees from
other countries who have suffered because of their political beliefs, is
giving thought to how it may assist individuals in Germany and Austria
who today find themselves faced by a tragic situation.
Hull further instructed the Ambassador to involve the Argentine government.
Significantly, Hull’s telegram to the British Embassy addressed “the urgency of the
problem with which the world is faced and the necessity of speedy, cooperative effort,
under governmental supervision, if widespread human suffering is to be averted.” 24
The tones of the letter, Welles’ memoranda, and Hull’s telegrams are very
positive, even optimistic. From Morgenthau’s position in the Treasury, it must have
seemed that the government was making a strong effort. Indeed, many people within the
government were doing so. At first, Morgenthau did not recognize the relational
undertow that was dragging refugee issues into a bureaucratic abyss of inactivity.
Morgenthau and his government compatriots were not the only people who had
faith in rescue action. In fact, the country at large was still optimistic about rescue in
1938. Irving Lehman, Associate Judge on the New York Court of Appeals, and a
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member of the prominent Lehman family involved in both New York politics and the
organized Jewish community, provides one such example. Lehman sent a gushing and
adulatory letter to President Roosevelt on March 28, congratulating him on his efforts. In
that letter, Lehman told the President, “I feel that last week you have done much not only
to rouse the conscience of humanity but to restore sanity to a world gone mad…As an
American and as a Jew I want to say ‘Thank you!’” Clearly, Morgenthau was not
alone. 25
By July of 1938, these plans had come to fruition in the form of the Evian
conference on refugees. Organized largely at the insistence of President Roosevelt and
the U.S. Government, Evian created the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. In
truth, Evian failed to concretely help suffering people, as 30 of the 32 countries involved
did not enact any change to current immigration laws, despite, for example, the efforts of
Sumner Welles to effect a U.S. policy change. Notwithstanding its inadequacy, the Evian
Conference did demonstrate an initiative of sorts and a genuine desire to help. Whatever
the true nature of the conference, for the time being it kept up appearances. For the time
being, Morgenthau was willing to let the State Department do its job. 26
Indicating the mood of the country, optimism persisted in the press until the
events of Kristallnacht. Usually regarded as the beginning of the Holocaust, on this
25
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“Night of Broken Glass” Nazis burned Jewish synagogues and businesses and terrorized
Jewish citizens, killing 91 and deporting 8000 to concentration camps. Kristallnacht
spurred Morgenthau to action. On November 16, 1938, he called his friend Franklin
Roosevelt on the telephone to discuss his ideas. A selection from Morgenthau’s diary on
that date speaks for itself:
I [Morgenthau] said, “ I have got the first concrete suggestion to make for
the Jewish refugees.” He [FDR] said, “Well, for heaven’s sake, what is
it?” I said, “Constantin Maguire has sent me a letter suggesting that we
make a settlement with Great Britain and France on their war debts for
British Guinea and French Guinea, and then somehow or other raise
enough money to buy off Holland for Dutch Guinea.”
After more discussion Morgenthau continued,
The thing to do is for us to get some geographer that Mr. Bowman can
recommend and look over all of the colonies belonging to France and
England wherever they are and see which of those could take a population
and I want to say here that in discussing this with Mrs. Morgenthau I think
it is most important that whatever is done is opened up to all refugees
irrespective of religion; that it should not be just for the Jews … [With]
the temper of the people today we can make this a political refuge for all
creeds. I think the public is ready. My motto is, “Nothing ventured,
nothing gained.” The point is the President has this. Nobody is helping
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him. I am at least doing the spade work. The thing to do is have it ready
before Congress comes. [Emphasis my own]
It is significant that Morgenthau was personally taking the initiative in the interest of the
fates of all refugees, not just those of Jewish descent. This appears to have been a largely
humanitarian urge recognizing the plurality inherent to the issue, rather than an
expression of ethnic solidarity, as some historians (and Cordell Hull) would assert.27
However, the august John Morton Blum includes excerpts from the document
quoted above, but views the document and its significance very differently. Blum
concludes that “Morgenthau … worried about the European Jews,” and uses the
document to emphasize Morgenthau’s failure to come up with a plan that worked.
Perhaps it is more significant that Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, attempted to
delve into the issue at all. Significantly, Blum omits Morgenthau’s stated concern for
human beings regardless of ethnicity; while “refugees” often functioned as a linguistic
euphemism for “Jewish refugees,” Morgenthau’s own words on the subject must be
considered. The fact that he spelled it out so clearly, “I think it is most important that
whatever is done is opened up to all refugees irrespective of religion; that it should not
be just for the Jews” would indicate he was aware of the prevailing sentiment and was in
fact challenging it. However, following Blum’s trajectory, the historical consensus
became that Morgenthau was one angry Jew, only out to save his people. The historical
27
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literature surrounding the Morgenthau Plan for reconstructing (or rather deconstructing)
postwar Germany latched onto the idea of Morgenthau as an angry (and often vengeful)
Jew. Perhaps it is time for a new exploration of the archives and a rethinking of
Morgenthau. 28
Historiographical musings aside, the aforementioned conversation between
Morgenthau and FDR was the beginning of a series of discussions about the possibility of
establishing refugee colonies somewhere in the Southern world. Throughout the process,
Morgenthau remained active in the governmental and private discourse on helping the
people whom the Nazis made refugees. Only a few days after speaking with Roosevelt,
Morgenthau invited Dr. Isaiah Bowman to visit his home and discuss the issue. An
expert on the subject, Bowman was both President of Johns Hopkins University and a
renowned geographer of Latin America. They concluded that a Costa Rican colony
would be the best option. A week later, The Ezekiel Plan for refugees showed up in the
Morgenthau Diaries, furthering the idea of a refugee colony. With Morgenthau doing
serious legwork and planning, the issue demonstrated his early desire to help; this was a
perfect example of Morgenthau’s early activism for the suffering people of Europe.
Eventually, the hope for a Jewish homeland in Palestine would mirror the earlier idea for
a colony. 29
By December, word had gotten out that Morgenthau was a strong supporter of the
refugees, and people were sending him desperate pleas for rescue. A December 15 letter
28
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to Morgenthau from Walter Hes, one man out of the many trapped in the Rheinland,
typified the plight of refugees. Hes begged Morgenthau,
On account of what happened to the churches in Germany, our people of
the Jewish faith have no right of existence. Out of pure personal interest
in my fellow men, I am writing to you as the last hope, most respected Mr.
Secretary, because I dare believe that you would help two people who are
without any means, and cannot afford their necessary immigration…I have
in my possession an affidavit for the U.S.A., but must wait for a high
admission number. You know, of course, how necessary it is for us to
immigrate…I am convinced that you in your high station have a good deal
of influence, but I also know that you try to understand the problems of
the lower classes, and it may be possible for you to get such an
appointment for me.
Morgenthau forwarded this letter and many more like it to the President, raising
Roosevelt’s awareness of the situation. Unfortunately, there was another much larger
problem in play. Although it was unknown at the time, several crucially important U.S.
consuls were sabotaging the admission of refugees with ridiculously stringent and
unequally applied regulations. For the time being, Morgenthau was unaware that while
he was working to help the Nazis’ victims, key State Department officials at home and
abroad were doing exactly the opposite. Breckinridge Long, the man in charge of refugee
affairs, allowed his anti-Semitism to get in the way of his obligation to help refugees.
Several U.S. consular officials abroad were increasing obstacles to emigration, and the
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combination of the two proved deadly for many. That hidden secret would come to light
later. 30
In June of 1939, refugees were once again at the forefront of Morgenthau’s mind.
On June 5, 1939, Morgenthau telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull regarding the
plight of the passengers of the Hamburg American Line’s SS St. Louis. Morgenthau told
Hull, “Some of my good friends in New York have called me up about this terrible
tragedy on this boat the St. Louis with those 900 refugees on it,” and pressed Hull for
action. Morgenthau dealt in his area of expertise – money – and promoted the cause of
the Jewish relief organizations who were attempting to finance the rescue. Hull insisted
that the matter lay between the refugees and the Cuban government, but Morgenthau
persisted. He phoned Hull several times, and independently sent the Coast Guard to
follow the boat, tracking its location so that rescuers could save the refugees the very
moment it were “legally” possible. Tragically, despite the sincere efforts of many people
within the organized Jewish community and the U.S. government, all safe ports refused
entry to the S.S. St. Louis. Bureaucratic shuffling, strict regulations, and
miscommunications between the Cuban government and private relief organizations in
regards to money condemned these nine hundred people to return to Europe, where the
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Nazis murdered a large percentage of them. Unfortunately, this was not the last time that
this type of thing happened. 31
The administrative style of FDR allowed for overlapping jurisdictions, which at
that time had proved a blessing and not a curse; Morgenthau had been able to assert
himself into the S.S. Saint Louis issue in a strong way. However, Morgenthau was not
the man responsible for refugees, and as the crisis in Europe escalated, Morgenthau
devoted less time to the issue. Again, as Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau was
necessarily consumed with the monumental task of financing a world war. However,
there is strong evidence that he maintained concern for refugees throughout this time and
did what time and existing legislation allowed. In just one example, during August of
1941 the Treasury Department worked to facilitate the American Committee to Save
Refugees’ distribution of food packages through the Portuguese Red Cross. 32
In addition to facilitating concrete aid, Morgenthau remained attuned to the
refugees’ need for a new home outside of Europe. As other options for rescue (such as a
Latin American colony) appeared less feasible, Morgenthau’s attention turned to
Palestine. The issues of refugee rescue and powerful Zionism are often linked, especially
in the work of Jewish organizations like the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs.
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The State and Treasury departments were aware of a growing Zionism from the
beginning, and this strand of aid increasingly influences Morgenthau through time. 33
The British Balfour Declaration of 1917 had been a “declaration of sympathy with
Jewish Zionist aspirations,” but the British White Paper of 1939 limited Jewish
immigration to Palestine to 75,000 over the next five years. Although this was a
relatively small number, Zionist organizations continued to hope for and work toward the
goal of rescue and eventual evacuation to Palestine. Importantly, Morgenthau was in
contact with several of these organizations, and they pleaded their case whenever
possible. On September 3, Emmanuel Neumann from the Emergency Committee for
Zionist affairs sent Morgenthau and Sumner Welles memoranda expressing a “hope that
no further steps would be taken toward implementing the White Paper,” and a desire to
keep Palestine open to Jewish and refugee immigration. Welles, too, was working to
resolve the issue. 34
In December 1941, the United States officially entered the war, and financing the
war effort made increasing demands on Morgenthau’s time and energy. There was an
“unprecedented expansion of the nation’s budget during World War II,” and Morgenthau
was at the helm. Furthermore, refugee affairs had always technically been the domain of
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the State Department, and due to the increasing demands of the war, Morgenthau no
longer had the luxury of intervening. It seems that Morgenthau had every reason to
believe that the State Department would take care of the matter. Undersecretary Sumner
Welles had already demonstrated a desire to help refugees, and had worked toward their
rescue. At this point, State’s shortcomings simply had not come to light, and Morgenthau
must not have felt justified to intrude onto their turf. 35
Despite his narrowing focus on the economic aspects of warfare, Morgenthau was
by no means indifferent to refugees; in fact, he recognized that their situation was
growing more dire. In an October 13, 1943 meeting of Morgenthau’s Treasury staff, one
moment the group was discussing procurement; in another moment the conversation
turned to refugees. The State Department had finally appointed Secretary Hull a personal
assistant in charge of the refugees; Morgenthau thought this was three years too late.
During the meeting he grew increasingly agitated and finally burst out with a strong
statement. “God help the refugees,” Morgenthau exclaimed, “I think it is outrageous.” 36
Palestine also remained in Morgenthau’s consciousness during this time. In one
example, in December of 1942, Morgenthau telephoned Governor Herbert Lehman to let
him know “…at the suggestion of Sam Rosenman [Justice of the New York Supreme
Court and advisor to President Roosevelt], I’m having a few people together at my house
for supper to discuss Palestine...and what we should advise the President [to do].” It
follows that even during his relatively less active period, Morgenthau was probably
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moving toward his eventual activism that would climax with his work with the United
Jewish Appeal. 37
In 1943, the campaign to save the victims of the Nazi regime was becoming
increasingly more crucial, as the “Final Solution” – the euphemistically termed mass
murder of over 6 million of Europe’s citizens – had been in place since at least the spring
of 1942. The first unconfirmed reports of mass murder appeared in Thomas Mann’s
December 1941 and January 1942 BBC radio broadcasts. By June of 1942, the BBC had
released a detailed report of genocide in Poland, documenting “the physical
extermination of the Jewish population on Polish soil.” Dr. Gerhard Reigner, the agent of
the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland, tried to alert the U.S., but the State
Department originally concealed the information. Through the efforts of Reigner and
Rabbi Stephen Wise, among others, with the aid of the sympathetic Undersecretary of
State Sumner Welles, it came to light. In September of 1942, “Undersecretary Welles
finally cut the Gordian knot of official bureaucracy and silence.” Beyond these facts,
there is a great deal of historical literature devoted to exploring exactly the extent of what
the government knew and when, but historical consensus holds that by 1943 Jewish relief
organizations and several government officials had clearly documented and publicized
the fact of genocide. 38
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Undeniable, absolutely certain news of mass murder changed the climate of
refugee affairs. Now that all plausible deniability was removed, many people faced the
cruel facts and subsequently oriented themselves toward more action. For one,
Morgenthau responded to the gruesome and urgent information by reasserting himself
into the refugee policy issue, this time with increasing force and activism. The
Wednesday, July 21, edition of The New York Sun evidences Morgenthau’s growing role
with a story headlined “Allies Urged to Save Jews: Morgenthau Asks for Plan to Stop
Slaughter.” The story alerted readers, “Mr. Morgenthau said that every effort must be
made to stop the slaughter,” continuing, “He added that along with other freedom-loving
Americans, he was deeply interested in seeing that every possible step is taken to stop
this needless slaughter.” Significantly, Morgenthau was also quoted to have said, “As we
all know, if anything is to be done, it must be done quickly. For the corrupt leaders of
Fascism must recognize fully that the day of reckoning is not far off.” Soon, the issue of
the rescue of the Romanian Jews would force Breckinridge Long, a corrupt leader in the
U.S. State Department, to face his own day of reckoning. 39
Romania had a long history of anti-Semitism, but these Romanian Jews faced
enormous atrocity under the rule of the Iron Guard and its premier, General Ion
Antonescu, after the Nazis’ hostile takeover in 1941. This was widely reported after
1941, especially in 1942 and 1943. Istvan Deak’s Essays on Hitler’s Europe details the
Romanian Holocaust, demonstrating how The Iron Guard sought to “purify Romania” of
Quote “Undersecretary Sumner Welles finally cut” from Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable,
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its Jewish countrymen. Deak quotes the reaction of one Italian war correspondent,
Curzio Malaparte, to some of the events of 1941.
Hordes of Jews pursued by soldiers and maddened civilians armed with
knives and crowbars fled along the streets…Squads of soldiers hurled
hand grenades…into the cellars where many people had vainly sought
safety … Where the slaughter had been heaviest, the feet slipped in blood.
Ultimately, between 200,000 and 300,000 Romanian Jews died in the Holocaust, and by
mid-1943, their suffering and death had become a crucial issue that could not be
ignored. 40
The suffering of Romanian Jews came to light during 1943. Up until this point,
Morgenthau had trusted the State Department to do its job and save people. Before
Romania brought everything to a head, an exchange of frank letters between Secretaries
Morgenthau and Hull evidences Morgenthau’s lingering faith. The American Jewish
Congress had come up with a plan for rescuing the Jews of Romania, and the Treasury
department was facilitating it, using blocked accounts to promise repayment to backers in
Axis countries; this method kept the money from “aiding the enemy” during the war, but
still allowed for the relief of suffering people. On August 5, Morgenthau wrote to
Cordell Hull:
Dear Cordell, The President has asked me to … reply to … the American
Jewish Congress, relating to the proposal of the World Jewish Congress
40
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and the American Jewish Congress for the evacuation of thousands of
Jewish refugees from Rumania. Randolph Paul, who acts for me on all
matters relating to foreign funds control, tells me that your department was
informally advised … that the Treasury was prepared to take the necessary
action to implement this proposal. 41
Hull wrote back two days later,
I would say that the Treasury itself is entirely free to act on this matter and
to grant the necessary licenses if it should so decide. In the latter event the
State Department would be pleased to send the appropriate notifications
through State Department channels … Any view that this would make
funds available to the enemy is not correct; the funds would remain
blocked in Switzerland until the end of the war. 42
The plan seemed straightforward to Treasury, and apparently to Cordell Hull.
Their frankly unguarded language and easy exchange testified to this fact; both letters
were only a few paragraphs. The tone of each was open, cordial, and even positive—
Morgenthau addresses his memo not to “Mr. Secretary,” “Secretary Hull,” or “The State
Department,” but to “Dear Cordell.” In an era bound and defined by the mandates of
Emily Post, the use of a social rather than professional heading indicated ease,
familiarity, and trust. Put simply, Morgenthau asked Hull about it, and Hull told him to
proceed with the plan. Under normal circumstances, this would have been an open and
shut case, but in FDR’s brave new world of modern bureaucratic infighting, it was far
41
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from over. The desperately critical rescue operation faced protracted and bitter
procrastination from State Department bureaucrats. After they learned of the plan, and
Treasury’s willingness to facilitate it, sadly, “The State Department’s own records show
that its personnel spent the next several weeks searching for defects in the proposal and
looking for reasons that the funds should not be sent.” State and Treasury territory was
overlapping here, and the results were disastrous. Unfortunately, State won the first few
rounds of fighting. 43
A few weeks after the exchange of letters between Hull and Morgenthau, Peter
Bergson, the chairman of the Zionist relief organization Emergency Conference to Save
the Jews of Europe, sent Secretary Henry Morgenthau a passionately pleading letter.
Bergson pointed out that the State Department had that very week created a commission
to save European art, while ignoring the 4 million human beings scheduled for murder.
Bergson lamented, “weeks pass and many more thousands of innocent Jews in Europe
uselessly lose their lives and, practically nothing is being done.” Bergson ended his
letter with an urgent plea to Morgenthau, “with the hope that you will undertake to urge
your colleagues to proceed with the creation of the necessary machinery—a specific
governmental agency—to save the remaining Jews of Europe.” 44
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On September 3, Morgenthau sent Bergson a reassuring reply. He told Bergson,
“Rest assured that I am already doing everything in my power, consistent with my
position in the government, to facilitate the rescue of these oppressed people.” Granted,
Bergson had exaggerated the government’s inaction; facilitating the work of private relief
organizations and pursuing the available options was no small task. But Bergson had
highlighted the grievous situation in the State Department – their refugee divisions were
accomplishing nothing, or worse. 45
Romania brought these issues to a head. In September, Herbert Lehman, the
former Governor of New York who now worked in refugee affairs for the State
Department and later for the UN, alerted Morgenthau of State’s failure to send the
American legation in Bern Morgenthau’s cables authorizing the action of the World
Jewish Congress for relief of the Romanian and French Jews. Morgenthau looked into
the matter, and finally found fault with State. He saw that the State department had been
dragging its heels, and was determined to find out why and put a stop to it. Part Two will
further examine the bureaucratic undercurrents that led to this situation, but at any rate,
what happened was clearly quite problematic. In fact, the situation started to look very
intentional, and Morgenthau was finally, in his own words, “outraged!” 46
On November 2, 1943, General Counsel for the Treasury Randolph Paul sent
Morgenthau a memo to update him on the situation. There is more confusion and
45
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intrigue concerning licenses to the World Jewish Congress; this time, Morgenthau
learned that Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long had unnecessarily delayed
the process by consulting the British, after Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Pehle
assured him this was unnecessary. Long was aware delays like this were very costly in
terms of human life, for the Romanian situation was deteriorating rapidly. The Treasury
was aware as well, and Paul’s memo for Secretary Morgenthau reflects his growing
suspicion of the State Department. It also foreshadows a change in Morgenthau’s
dealings with State. 47
On November 23, Pehle spelled out the general fears of Morgenthau and the
Treasury in a group meeting to discuss Romanian Jewish evacuation. Pehle said, “There
are two phases of this matter; one is the thing that deals with this narrow case; the other
one is the question of how you feel on the broader issue.” He continued, “The broader
issue is, at what point is the whole question of whether the State Department is going to
facilitate evacuation of refugees and all the things that are tied in with that – at what point
is that going to be brought out in the open.” Morgenthau replied, “You ask me how far is
the moon from here.” The moon turned out to be closer than he expected. 48
The meeting further brought out that the problem was someone in the State
Department, and the facts pointed toward Breckinridge Long or someone in his office.
Morgenthau fully supported his staff, led by John Pehle and Randolph Paul, as they
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decided to go after the culprit. However, Morgenthau realized it would be a difficult
task. As he said, they were
Up against a successive generation of people like those in the State
Department who don’t like to do this kind of thing, and it is only by my
being Secretary of the Treasury and being vitally interested in these things,
with the help of you people having first made up your mind…that I can do
it. I am all for you, not that I am a cynic or discouraged. I mean, I will do
everything I can, and we will get it done. But don’t think you are going to
be able to nail anybody in the State Department to the cross.
For the time being, Morgenthau’s solution was to write a letter to Cordell Hull, and leave
it up to him to “get angry at his own people.” It is clear that Morgenthau’s faith in the
system was diminishing, and while he retained his regard for Hull, Morgenthau no longer
trusted the State Department in the face of mounting evidence of their failures. 49
Less than 2 months later, Pehle and Paul had found their culprit in the State
Department; in fact, they uncovered several. John Pehle, Randolph Paul, and Josiah
DuBois prepared an 18 page report for Secretary Morgenthau, dated January 13, 1944.
Provocatively titled Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in
the Murder of the Jews, it detailed the criminally negligent failure of the State
Department on the refugee question. The report was masterfully written, the result of a
deep investigation of all available information. One invaluable source was Breckinridge
Long’s self-incriminating testimony before Congress, at which he vacillated ad nauseum,
49
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contradicted himself throughout, and even lied outright. For example, Long used some
creative math when testifying about the numbers of refugees allowed into the country; he
inflated the numbers where in reality even the small legal quota had not been filled. “The
most flagrant was his claim that the United States had taken in 580,000 Jewish refugees
since Hitler came to power. People familiar with the situation knew that not over
250,000 refugees had come and many of them were not Jews.” 50
In sum, the State Department was guilty “not only of gross procrastination and
willful failure to act, but even of willful attempts to prevent action from being taken to
rescue Jews from Hitler.” The U.S. government had known about the Nazis’ policy of
genocide for over a year, but the State department had delayed and procrastinated and
refused to act. Tragically, the report said, “While the State Department has been thus
‘exploring’ the whole refugee problem…hundreds of thousands of Jews have been
allowed to perish.” 51
Breckinridge Long, now known to be anti-Semitic, emerges as the main culprit.
The very man in the U.S. government who was most responsible for the lives of the
refugees had been purposefully sabotaging their rescue. Upon receipt of the report,
Morgenthau took matters into his own hands. With firm resolve, Morgenthau gave the
report to his dear friend President Roosevelt, who shortly thereafter issued Executive
Order # 9417 creating the War Refugee Board that would save over 250,000 lives.
50
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Morgenthau risked a personal friendship to go over the State Department’s head to the
President, and his faith in FDR was not misplaced. The Chief Executive solved the
problem and set in motion the machinery that would save many lives because Henry
Morgenthau and his staff, Pehle, Paul, and DuBois, had taken the initiative in the U.S.
government to start the process of saving these people. Secretary Morgenthau, Secretary
Hull, and Secretary of War Stimson were on the Board, with its committees drawn from
their staffs. Pehle went on to become the board’s executive director. Despite inadequate
government funding, the WRB worked tirelessly until the end of the war. However, it
would not be the end of Morgenthau’s activism on behalf of the remaining Jews of
Europe; he would take on a new challenge after the Allied victory. 52
On April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and
passed from this life. Harry S. Truman became the new President, and he had his own
postwar plans for the Treasury. Despite his excellent record, Truman did not want
Morgenthau, although he kept him on staff while away at the Potsdam conference. Late
in July, Morgenthau grew tired of rumblings that Truman might fire him and he
subsequently resigned from office. 53
This may have been the end of Morgenthau’s political career, but it was not to be
the end of Morgenthau’s activism on behalf of Jewish refugees. July 7, 1945, the week
prior to Morgenthau’s resignation, Felix Frankfurter sent Morgenthau a letter, enclosing
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an extract from a speech made by Lord Balfour in 1920, following the Balfour
Declaration; it dealt with the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Clearly,
Morgenthau had been aware of and concerned with the hopes of Zionists for many years
(and his Orthodox Jewish Secretary had made sure that Morgenthau got to know several
prominent Zionists) but the letter indicates that it was on his mind near his resignation,
and foreshadows events to come. 54
The week of Morgenthau’s resignation was a turning point for Morgenthau. In
the midst of a routine meeting on July 13, 1945, while Morgenthau is discussing his
economic plans that would crystallize in the Bretton Woods legislation (and shape the
future international economy), he made a most interesting statement. Morgenthau was
allowed, as the Secretary of the Treasury, to make a report to Congress at any time, and
he wanted to make one before he left. Jokingly, a colleague referred to it as his political
will, but Morgenthau challenged, “This isn’t my political will; this is my political
coming-out party.” 55
While he is technically discussing money matters, Morgenthau’s choice of words
and the timing of this utterance – the week of his resignation as Secretary of the Treasury,
preceding his monumental work with the United Jewish Appeal – lends a more symbolic
meaning to this conversational snippet. It also gives a clue as to Morgenthau’s mindset at
the time. Free from bureaucratic constraints and presented with the luxury of free time,
Morgenthau really was “coming-out.” Unencumbered by the war and politics and
54
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Cabinet bureaucracy, he was finally able to be the unapologetic, fiercely determined
activist he had been becoming for years.
Since the 1930’s, Morgenthau had been a financial contributor to the United
Jewish appeal. During the war, he used government machinery to facilitate the UJA and
other organizations in their private rescue efforts. Morgenthau had worked tirelessly to
save refugees and Holocaust victims. He had worked closely with Zionist organizations
and was sympathetic to their hopes. It was a logical transition for Morgenthau to move
into working for the United Jewish Appeal postwar, to move “from the lands of death to
the land of hope – to Palestine.” 56
Indeed, there was a great deal of work to be done. The end of the war did not
mean the end of suffering, or the end of aid work. In many ways, it was another
beginning. For, the remaining Jews of Europe were predominantly living in displaced
persons camps, and many or most were on the brink of death from starvation or illness. It
was a monumental task just to return so many people to good health, but there was also
the matter of where they would eventually end up. Most people had no homes or family
to return to, and Europe was still an inhospitable place for its surviving Jews. According
to its own reports, the Displaced Persons and Welfare Section of the Military
Government in the American sector of Berlin registered 17,980 new displaced persons
from July 1945 to January 1946. Over 5000 were stateless persons and concentration
camp internees; all but 220 of these were turned out of the camp during the same six
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month reporting period. The public health report from the following six months period
noted that during the winter “the incidence of lousiness…[and] typhoid…increased, and
from available epidemiological data well over 50% of these cases were among refugees.”
The task of returning refugees to normal lives was monumental, indeed. 57
Morgenthau summed up the problem in 1946, “For the remaining Jews of Europe
… victory has not yet brought the fruits of peace. For them, the ancient story of trial and
tribulation has not ended yet.” For many people, including Morgenthau, Palestine
provided the best possible solution. 58
Morgenthau was in the perfect position to help make that dream a reality. As the
Secretary of the Treasury he had honed the skills needed to manage monumental sums of
money. Consequently, he must have felt that spearheading and masterminding the
fundraising campaign for the United Jewish Appeal was a logical use of his expertise.
The United Jewish Appeal agreed. On February 20, 1946, at the beginning of what
would be a long career with the organization, Henry Montor wrote Morgenthau,
We are all familiar with the great service you rendered to the
welfare of the oppressed and suffering Jews overseas during the
war years and prior thereto, and we are grateful for the
opportunity of paying our respects to you at this meeting and, at
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the same time, of being further encouraged by your stimulation. 59
After resigning from his office, Morgenthau became increasingly more involved
with the United Jewish Appeal, and it turned out to be quite a partnership. As evidence,
the UJA met and exceeded enormous fundraising goals with Morgenthau at the helm.
From 1947- 1950, Morgenthau served as the organization’s chairman and helped raise
$465 million dollars to bring about the State of Israel. The way he saw it, the UJA was
not “dealing…in dollars, but in human lives.” He urged people to think about how many
lives they could save when they made their contributions to the UJA. Judging by these
standards, Morgenthau’s fundraising may have helped even more people than did the
War Refugee Board. 60
In the years following, Morgenthau worked tirelessly for the United Jewish
Appeal, and he accomplished a monumental fundraising goal; his dream of a Jewish
homeland finally came to fruition. Later, Morgenthau recalled his first trip to the newly
created Nation of Israel as one of the most important moments of his life. Over the years,
Morgenthau had steadily transformed from Roosevelt’s money man to a champion of the
Jewish people. His evolution to activism was finally complete. 61
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CONCLUSION TO PART ONE
This path to activism was certainly frought with obstacles. While Morgenthau
was clearly concerned and involved since the late 1930’s, he was unable to accomplish
much on their behalf until several years later. Even after Morgenthau lost faith in the
ability of the State Department to do its job, he faced more obstacles. Part Two will take
a closer look at the patterns of relationships that defined and limited Morgenthau’s path
and his options.
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Part Two:
Examining Relationships and Daring to Ask Why
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Part Two:
Examining Relationships and Daring to Ask Why
The events discussed in Part One require further exploration. Why did these
events unfold as they did? Beyond the anti-Semitism of Breckinridge Long, what created
the reluctance in the State Department? Furthermore, why were relationships within the
Cabinet so strained? A deeper analysis reveals that Morgenthau was fighting hidden
dynamics of power stemming from Roosevelt’s administrative style and the interplay of
different personalities and forces within the Cabinet. The competitive administrative
style of FDR, the ingrained institutional cultures inside the cabinet, the State
Department’s obsessive fear of communists, and the inevitable intergenerational tension
between men of the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries all proved of critical
importance. Each of these factors had a profound influence in restraining Morgenthau’s
options, shaping his path of action, and ultimately determining the outcomes of events.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE OF FDR

There is an impressive canon of scholarly work on the administrative style of
FDR. Political scientists and psychological professionals, not to mention several
respected historians, have analyzed FDR’s administrative style from multiple angles.
Some of these works dealing with personality, institutional structure, and power politics
are particularly relevant for the attempt to understand the challenges facing Morgenthau.
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Historians have left the opportunity open to examine the implications of FDR’s
administrative style in the Morgenthau case. Surprisingly, no one has yet closed the gap
between these fields by synthesizing the troubling facts of Morgenthau’s particular
situation and the insightful literature exploring FDR’s administrative style. This thesis
will attempt to bridge the distance and encourage a new understanding of Morgenthau’s
particular historical situation; here, applying fresh insights provides a useful and
revealing perspective.
First, let us briefly outline the historiography so that the insights it offers may be
applied. Echoing sentiments that Secretary of War Henry Stimson eloquently voiced to
his diary over sixty years ago, currently there is a rough scholarly consensus among many
historians and political scientists that FDR’s administrative style was incredibly
inefficient at times, and his organization “famously chaotic.” 62 Although his organization
was small in comparison with the Executive Branch as it exists today, it was quite large
for the times, and FDR put a lot of effort into expanding it, and people had mixed reviews
about the results even at the time. While Stimson felt that the chaos and inefficiency was
simply because FDR happened to be incredibly disorganized, the modern
historiographical agreement is that FDR actually benefited from purposefully creating
and manipulating this disorganization. It appears that “chaos” was his style; it is often
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argued that while FDR may have created a bureaucratic monster, it served himself, his
country, and the free world very well. 63
Henry Stimson wrote on this topic often and well. A few days after FDR’s
untimely death in 1945 Stimson wrote,
In this retrospect the importance of his leadership and the strong sides of
his character loom up into their rightful proportions. He has never been a
good administrator and the consequence of this has made service under
him as a Cabinet officer difficult and often harassing ... but his vision over
the broad reaches … has always been quick and clear and guided by a very
strong faith in the future of our country and of freedom, democracy, and
humanitarianism throughout the world. 64
It is the juxtaposition of good and bad elements that make this subject so interesting.
There were certainly problems with FDR’s administrative style, but the President still
managed to achieve a victory in the greatest war the world had ever seen.
For the purpose of exploring the Morgenthau effort, it is necessary to cover some
highlights of some relevant books from the field of administrative history. The existence
of a general consensus in the field allows for a careful discussion of a few books that
have helped inspire a fresh look at Secretary Morgenthau.
One journalist and political scientist, Matthew Kerbel, encapsulates why studying
executive administrative style is important. Kerbel argues, “If one views the White
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House bureaucracy as an extension of the president, the importance of management style
to executive organization is great.” 65 This is especially true in an administration as
driven by the personality of its executive as that of FDR. The force of his personality
combines with his monumental impact on the modern presidency, making FDR a central
figure in most volumes on the subject.
One of the first of these volumes was Richard E. Neustadt’s seminal 1960 study
Presidential Power. Neustadt broke ground in the field and after five reprintings it
remains one of the key volumes in the historiography of presidential power. As his title
suggests, Neustadt analyzed the multifaceted power of the chief executive. He argued
that presidential power is the power to persuade. In his analysis, Neustadt viewed
presidential weaknesses as critical windows into each President’s pursuit and
maintenance of power. In each Presidency, “strength or weakness … turns on [the
President’s] personal capacity to influence the conduct of the men who make up the
government.” While drawing examples of weakness from the Eisenhower and Truman
years, Neustadt wove “wistful glances” at the presidency of FDR throughout his analysis.
For Neustadt, the glory days of FDR endure as the shining zenith of presidential power
or, as he put it, the power to persuade. 66
It follows that Roosevelt’s brand of persuasion centered around personal
influence; Neustadt quoted Roosevelt when discussing this issue.
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The Treasury is so large and far flung and ingrained in its practices that I
find it almost impossible to get the action and results I want – even with
Henry [Morgenthau] there. But the Treasury is not to be compared with
the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to
get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats
and then you’d know what a real problem was. 67
While Neustadt used this particular quote to consider FDR, it invites insight into
Morgenthau’s situation because it provides a window on both Roosevelt’s mind and
cabinet culture. FDR had to control an often difficult bureaucracy, but the Treasury and
State departments were particularly perplexing for him. They were particularly unruly
and difficult to manage. Even Roosevelt, with his arguably unparalleled leadership
prowess, was unable to completely get his way. Imagine the difficulties Morgenthau,
lacking Roosevelt’s personal force and official power, faced in trying to circumvent or
change State Department policy!
In the updated 1990 edition, Neustadt quoted Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. on FDR’s
method of creating overlapping jurisdictions to maintain personal control over events.
Neustadt, quoting Schlesinger, wrote:
His favorite technique was to keep grants of authority incomplete,
jurisdictions uncertain, charters overlapping. The result of this
competitive theory of administration was often confusion and exasperation
on the operating level; but no other method could so reliably insure that in
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a large bureaucracy filled with ambitious men eager for power the
decisions, and the power to make them, would remain with the
President. 68
A few pages later, Neustadt explained his view with another Schlesinger quote.
Situations had to be permitted to develop, too crystallize, to clarify; the
competing forces had to vindicate themselves in the actual pull and tug of
conflict; public opinion had to face the question, consider it, and
pronounce upon it. Only then, at the long, frazzled end, would the
president’s institutions consolidate and precipitate a result.69
Eminent political scientist Fred I. Greenstein has written a number of volumes on
Presidential leadership, the most recent of which is The Presidential Difference that came
onto the scene in 2004. Greenstein’s work functions in the political science field much as
Neustadt’s does for history. This volume recapitulates several themes found in his other
books. Greenstein echoed Neustadt when he writes that the FDR administration marked
the beginning of what is now called “the modern presidency” and that resulting from the
“New Deal, World War II, and [FDR’s] entrepreneurial leadership…there was a vast
expansion of the scope and influence of the federal government.” 70 Greenstein went on
to describe that starting with FDR presidents took increasingly more policy initiative,
“Drawing on their sweeping administrative powers in an era of activist government and
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global leadership.” 71 Greenstein credited FDR with ushering in the era of activist
government; ironically, before Morgenthau’s situation came to his attention Roosevelt’s
system effectively thwarted the activism of the most determined activist in the cabinet.
However, when Morgenthau finally went to him, Roosevelt created the War
Refugee Board that saved many. It is a complex issue indeed; for the chaotic elements of
the administrative style created problems that allowed Breckinridge Long to get away
with murder, but the decisive way that FDR used his political authority allowed him to
remedy the problem in the end.
While the sweeping, general scope of his analysis precludes mentioning
Morgenthau, Greenstein highlights a theme that is very important for Morgenthau’s
particular situation: competition. Greenstein quotes the august historian Arthur
Schlesinger as “arguing that FDR adhered to a ‘competitive theory of administration,’
geared to keeping decision making in his hands and maximizing his information.” 72
Greenstein upholds Schlesinger’s view that Roosevelt’s leadership style required “The
competing forces … to vindicate themselves in the actual pull and tug of conflict.” 73
Greenstein lacks Schlesinger’s certainty, but agrees with him nonetheless:
Whether Roosevelt consciously held such a conception is uncertain. His
elusiveness and his practice of playing aides off against one another
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undoubtedly did enhance his influence and information, but at a cost. His
practices made for needless rivalries and poor morale. 74
This competition figures prominently into the analysis of this thesis, because of the
strained atmosphere that competition combined with incalculably high stakes inevitably
created.
Perhaps because of the fact that Schlesinger, Neustadt, and Greenstein so
excellently analyzed FDR’s leadership style, others have often shied away from doing so.
Greenstein points out that with a few notable exceptions, much of the historiography of
presidential accomplishments is more policy-centered than personality-driven. FDR may
be a special case, because his force of personality was so strong, and he accomplished so
much; his biographers have done a good job of analyzing him in this context. At any
rate, Greenstein is absolutely correct in turning the focus to the means rather than merely
on the ends. Indeed, the two are inextricably interdependent, as Part Two of this thesis
will demonstrate in the case of the activism of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau.
Decreasing in scale, instead of observing the administration as a whole Herspring
analyzes FDR’s leadership style in relating to the Pentagon. While it does not always
parallel the experience of the cabinet, this specific case study provides useful insights
nonetheless. Herspring writes,
Unlike his successors, Franklin Roosevelt relied far more on personal
relationships than on highly structured organizations in order to govern …
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the structure may have been chaotic, but there was a certain logic to the
President’s style of governance. 75
The logic of FDR’s style was undeniable. It is certainly true that governing via personal
relationships centralized power around the chief executive and allowed him to
accomplish amazing things. Moving away from Herspring, however, the experience of
Henry Morgenthau clearly demonstrates the fatal flaw. FDR’s need for personal control
over situations (and the way that control consequently fostered interdepartmental
conflicts) almost always worked for the advantage of all involved. However, it
occasionally undermined the ability of different groups within the administration to work
effectively together without FDR’s version of “divine intervention.” To provide an
example from Herspring’s work on the military, Herspring noted,
Rivalry between the Army and Navy was a serious problem that inevitably
affected civil-military relations. On the one hand, such competition
permitted the president to divide and conquer when dealing with the two
services … while on the other it degraded the ability of the U.S. military to
fight a war effectively. 76
While Herspring was referring to FDR’s relations with the military, the same held true
for the cabinet.
Completing the circle, Neustadt’s student Matthew J. Dickinson took his ideas
and ran with them. In Dickinson’s Bitter Harvest, he analyzes the efficacy of FDR’s
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administrative style and calls for its application to the modern presidency. Dickinson
argues that applying FDR’s style would help modern presidents to govern an increasingly
large bureaucracy more effectively. He demonstrates that the modern presidents face
circumstances no more trying than those that FDR masterfully navigated. Dickinson’s is
a very provocative book, for it highlights the intentional nature of FDR’s administrative
style, and judges it as very highly effective. Significantly, while some believe that FDR
succeeded in winning the war in spite of his administrative style, Dickinson argues that it
was because of it that FDR was so successful. To make this argument, Dickinson
focuses on FDR’s refusal to delegate responsibility and his style of “competitive
adhocracy” that pitted bureaucrats against each other and fostered conflict. Dickinson
demonstrates that this unlikely strategy allowed FDR to maintain his personal control of a
diverse and sprawling governmental organization that was crucial to assuring that
organization functioned at its very best. 77
“Competitive adhocracy” is a tricky concept, indeed. It is by nature precarious,
rife with tensions, threatening to boil over. Because of this, it is all the more remarkable;
competition created conflicts that only Roosevelt could resolve, and he resolved them
beautifully. Roosevelt stood at the center, creating order out of chaos, organizing and
administering everything with his personal touch and ensuring that the decisions that
were eventually made were the best ones in line with his vision of the future. One feature
of this “competitive adhocracy” that allowed him to do exactly that involved overlapping
jurisdictions. While Dickinson argues that this was a good way to maintain FDR’s
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position as supreme referee, that may not always have been the case. The more important
the issue seemed to all parties involved, the more quickly it reached FDR and was
properly resolved. In cases of grand strategy and perceivably large issues this was
particularly effective. Competition allowed FDR to maintain control and make the
difficult decisions for which history praises him. But perhaps competition allowed issues
that some of the players involved felt were relatively “less important” to slip through the
cracks. Overlapping jurisdiction combined with a competitive spirit could have kept
some issues that were deigned relatively less important (or that simply did not initially
appear large enough to merit the President’s intervention) volleying back and forth from
bureaucrat to bureaucrat, locked in an irresolvable squabble about who was really in
charge. Often, nothing happened; the paper stacked higher.
Where there was great conflict, as in the situation of Morgenthau’s rescue efforts
for refugees, someone had to bring the issues to Roosevelt’s attention to achieve any
positive resolution. An issue like refugees, because it was beneath many people’s notice,
could slip through his fingers. FDR only had time to intervene so often; and for a long
time the structure that so often succeeded allowed Breckinridge Long to sit happily in his
office and effectively ensure the death of many.
Psychologist David P. Barash, one of the early contributors to the growth of
sociobiology, wrote a recent monograph on Game Theory and competition, titled The
Survival Game: How Game Theory Explains the Biology of Cooperation and
Competition. Barash’s book sheds a great deal of light on Morgenthau’s situation. At one
point, Barash discussed political rivalry in the context of game theory. He wrote, “Like
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two contestants in a particularly grueling tug-of-war, each side may long to ease up, but
fears that the other will take advantage, so both sides end up holding tight, straining
mightily … and often getting nowhere. Not uncommonly, the two players come out
somewhat behind.” In the Treasury Department’s tug-of-war with State, they certainly
came out behind on the refugee issue. State had more authority, and frustrated their
attempts. The competition took on an unhealthy angle that was not mutually beneficial or
cooperative (as FDR had intended), but why? In this instance, perhaps life functioned
like baseball. Barash put forward an example about Game Theory and baseball statistics
that easily lends itself to analogy here. Prolonged competition among the same group of
baseball players led to a leveling off of batting averages, as good pitchers and good
hitters adjusted to each other. They were able to maintain a nice equilibrium, unless the
rules were changed.
This system, in which offensive and defensive players gradually develop
an equilibrium of mutual best responses to each other tends to break down
whenever the rules are changed. In such cases, the balance was typically
shaken for a time, during which offensive and defensive players
experimented with different ways of doing things. Some did unusually
well, others were exceptionally inept. Eventually, a new equilibrium was
typically established, with each not only doing the best he could but—
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crucial for Game Theory perspective—the best he could against the
other. 78
Here, life imitated baseball. Indeed, the baseball explanation is merely one way
of wrapping one’s mind around the messy, complicated reality that simple, old-fashioned,
“healthy” competition becomes when that reality is viewed through the lens of
evolutionary biology. Indeed, World War II had changed the rules. The shifting daily
nature of reality in a World War created an atmosphere of constant change; if the
evolutionary biologists are correct (and I believe that they are), competition in such a
situation would be off-kilter. It might have unanticipated, oddly skewed results. In the
refugee rescue game, Morgenthau was pitted directly against Breckinridge Long. Long
was a magnificent defensive player, fiercely determined, clearly committed his own foul
“cause,” and he had the advantage of time and energy. Long was supposed to devote his
entire work to the refugee issue, whereas there was only a small overlap with
Morgenthau’s job. Morgenthau, as the Secretary of the Treasury, had other desperately
crucial issues to deal with. Ideally, in ordinary time the system would have worked
perfectly: Long could have reigned Morgenthau in if he violated too many immigration
laws, and Morgenthau could have forced Long to behave like a proper humanitarian. But
that did not happen; instead FDR’s competitive administrative style and typical
jurisdictional overlaps that usually worked so well simply didn’t this time. Under another
executive, the process of getting the President’s attention might not have progressed so
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slowly, because the competition that bought FDR time and allowed him to have the final
say would have been less of an issue. Greenstein, Neustadt, and Schlesinger have
demonstrated that FDR fostered competition as a means of maintaining personal power
over events. That was his style. But it was method, not madness. Another executive
would not have established the precedent for Executive Order 9417 that was needed to
right the situation quickly once it did come to his attention. It was clearly a complicated
issue, characterized by contingency, obviously in defiance of any simplistic and
comforting historical judgment.
But what does all of this mean for the story of Morgenthau? Applying these fresh
perspectives from political science, history, and psychology to Morgenthau’s situation
illuminates the background, provides important context, and helps explain Morgenthau’s
ability to accomplish his goal of rescue. In some ways, because it was necessary for him
to maintain Presidential control at such a crucial moment for the world, FDR created a
bureaucratic monster that Morgenthau and others had to reckon with. Stimson expressed
his frustration thus: “I told [FDR] frankly over the telephone that it was a bad
administration and asked him what a Cabinet was for and what Departments were for …
but I have small hope of reforming him. The fault is Rooseveltian and deeply ingrained.”
Whether or not it truly was a fault was debatable; however, the fact remains that certain
elements of FDR’s administrative style were frustrating for some in the Cabinet to deal
with. 79
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It is important to note that most historians and most of his contemporaries
credited FDR with saving the free world from the totalitarian Nazis. This author is
absolutely among his admirers. To say that his system generally functioned effectively
would be an extreme understatement. Any criticism of a man who accomplished so
much on behalf of humanity must be undertaken with the greatest care; it speaks volumes
that even the reporters of his time agreed never to portray him in an unflattering light.
However, no human being is entirely perfect, and FDR could not have foreseen every
implication of his administrative presidency’s competitive, “divide and conquer” style.
For Morgenthau’s rescue attempts, the implications of Roosevelt’s
administrative style were varied and diverse. For one, when Morgenthau finally
discussed the issues of late 1943 with Roosevelt, the President intervened and righted
things. A lesser president might have been afraid to go against the entrenched
bureaucracy; a lesser president would not have the precedents for unilateral power that
would have allowed him to do so. Clearly, it was FDR’s force of personality and stature
that, in the end, allowed the War Refugee Board to be created. Looking back at the
events discussed in Part One, that much is quite clear.
But perhaps it was also that very same administrative style, the very nature of
“competitive adhocracy,” that allowed FDR’s intervention to come so late in the game.
Morgenthau had to be absolutely certain that he was right before proceeding to the
highest authority; and the State Department had been very difficult to nail down. State
had effectively prevented Morgenthau from working effectively even from within his
position in the Treasury; they kept him from maneuvering the money raised by the
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organized Jewish community to help refugees. Because it wasn’t just a money issue, the
overlap of the jurisdictions had allowed State to thwart Morgenthau. And, it was, after
all, the fact that press reports and direct reports from Jewish organizations and refugees
themselves did not add up with the State Department’s story that finally drove
Morgenthau to go to FDR. It was not the problems they had created for him.
Overlapping jurisdiction hurt refugees; Treasury’s keen attention to reports from outside
sources alerted Morgenthau and his staff of the problem. They in turn alerted Roosevelt,
who stepped in immediately and saved the day. 80
Historian Michael Beschloss summed the problem thusly, “The President believed
his methods let him squeeze the best out of strong-willed, independent people. The
problem was that in the meantime, they could often do serious damage.” Beschloss
continued, “It should not have required a Morgenthau to blow the whistle on disgraceful
State Department efforts to stop the rescue of Jewish Refugees.” Granted, Breckinridge
Long, was something of a special case. He actually asserted in his diary on October 3,
1940, that he was doing FDR’s will. While this was flagrantly untrue, Long was able to
get away with his nefarious deeds for a very long time. Perhaps it is helpful to use one of
the President’s own metaphors to explain. FDR likened himself to a quarterback who
had to direct the plays from the field during his 100 Days Legislation; when examining
the situation of rescuing Holocaust victims, a football metaphor is appropriate as well.
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Only, this time, it seems that FDR had unintentionally created an institutional culture
where at least a handful of lesser quarterbacks were too self-aggrandizing, too
competitive, and too suspicious pass the ball to their open receivers in other departments.
Overlapping jurisdictions created territoriality on issues that otherwise might possibly
have been solved through mutual cooperation. 81
The example of Morgenthau’s relationship with the State Department during the
attempted rescue of Romanian Jews in 1943 perfectly exemplifies this point. Neustadt
observed in his general study that Roosevelt superintended the actions of his staff (and by
extension his cabinet), and arranged his administration so that people “knew what their
jobs were but they could not do it without watching, checking, jostling one another.” And
jostle they did. 82
As Part I demonstrates, the governmental response to the ordeal of the Romanian
Jews is well documented. The historiography surrounding the creation of the War
Refugee Board highlights this infamous example of bureaucratic incompetence. Again,
Morgenthau was trying to help the Romanian Jews; he was working within the
parameters of his job to facilitate the organized Jewish community’s monetary efforts.
During the ordeal, Morgenthau wrote Peter Bergsen, “Rest assured that I am already
doing everything in my power, consistent with my position in the government, to
facilitate the rescue of these oppressed people.” The key phrase here was “everything in
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my power consistent with my position in the government.” Morgenthau was working; but
historians know that Morgenthau and his compatriots in the Treasury Department faced
determined opposition from several State Department officials with their heels dug in as
trenchantly as collared bulldogs. This is no great revelation; until Morgenthau persuaded
FDR to intervene, Breckinridge Long was in charge of refugee affairs; he pushed forward
his bigoted policies and his staff of paper-pushers were beneath him apparently doing his
bidding without much question. 83
The State Department was “losing” memos, “forgetting” to send cables, and
basically blocking rescue attempts on several fronts. However, there were also a great
number of intelligent, solid, capable officials in the State Department. Providing two
excellent if vastly divergent examples, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and
Undersecretary Sumner Welles were both courageous men of no small character.
However, because of the undercurrents in the Cabinet, even these two men were “not
always on speaking terms;” 84 a fact which will be explored further in the next section.
At any rate, Hull was at least sympathetic to refugees. As evidence, in 1934 when it
became apparent that the Nazis were blocking emigration, Hull removed the police
certificate requirement Long had instituted that had become a barrier to U.S. entry (police
meant Gestapo in this context). 85 In another example, during September of 1943 former
New York Governor Herbert Lehman, in refugee affairs for the State Department and
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later for the UN, did his part. Lehman alerted Morgenthau of State’s failure to send
Morgenthau’s cables, which authorized the action of the World Jewish Congress for
relief of the Romanian and French Jews, to the American legation in Bern.
Clearly, there were more than a few good men in the Department of State.
However, if this is so, why did those who were trenchantly opposed to rescue efforts
succeed for so long? Hiding Anti-Semitism behind security concerns certainly helped,
but one tentative answer lies in FDR’s administrative style. Perhaps Breckinridge Long
was not the only bureaucratic monster in the situation—it would seem that competitive
adhocracy and overlapping jurisdiction earned at least a small share in the blame. As
Dickinson argues, FDR’s method of preserving near divine authority over events—
maintaining the proverbial “last say”—was certainly politically expedient in many cases.
However, even Dickinson admits the scholarly consensus is that FDR’s competitive
administrative style could be “enormously inefficient” at times. Stimson goes so far as to
label it an entirely “haphazard administration.” 86 To follow Neustadt’s analysis, it is
clear that FDR retained enormous presidential power this way, and his large part in
saving the free world exempts him from a great deal of criticism. But no man, no system
is perfect, and in this case, nurtured competition and overlapped jurisdictions exacted a
high cost that Romanian refugees had to pay in blood. 87
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The fact that it was difficult for people to work together harmoniously against a
backdrop of fierce competition for the administrative affections of such a charismatic
leader as FDR exacerbated other issues. Psychologist Alfie Kohn’s No Contest: The
Case Against Competition perfectly encapsulates the problem. Kohn wrote the following
about organizational structures that have been set up to encourage competition; “Most
striking of all is the impact of this arrangement on human relationship: a structural
incentive to see other people lose cannot help but drive a wedge between us and invite
hostility.” 88 In certain instances, like the Morgenthau situation, this fierce competition
mingled with the perpetual stress of administering a world war and produced a climate
that allowed bureaucratic manipulation at its worst; in such an environment, staffers from
different departments were set up to be suspicious of each other. Cultivated suspicion
could only have encouraged the State Department, with their long history of paranoia.
State feared the Nazis, the Communists, the Radicals, the liberals, the press, and the Jews.
The State Department also feared the Cabinet, Roosevelt, and in the end, even each other.
To demonstrate how deeply this suspicion ran and how widely its net was cast, in
November of 1942, Henry Stimson wrote the following about a conversation with
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. During one of his “usual diatribes,” 89
[Hull] breathed his customary fire and brimstone against the “starry-eyed”
members of the President’s entourage whom he described as young
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communists whose efforts would result in … a complete swing back to
reactionary-ism such as the Harding regime after the last war. Hull
asserted that this was actually taking place and even at the present day
chances would be against us … 90
Probably in Hull’s eyes, Morgenthau was one of these “starry-eyed young communists.”
A long-time member of Roosevelt’s entourage since his time as Governor of New York,
Morgenthau was the President’s neighbor in Hyde Park as well as his close friend. 91 In
fact, Morgenthau’s relative inexperience with fiscal matters—he had begun his career in
Agriculture, and that was where his heart remained—and his close relationship with FDR
could have led to Morgenthau’s having been considered something of a hanger-on.
Stimson, for one, thought Morgenthau was quite under-qualified to be Secretary of the
Treasury. 92 In all fairness, Morgenthau was no economist; in his heart he actually
preferred farming. And, as Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau was the architect and
administrator of many a New Deal financial policy that seemed to reek of Communism in
the noses of many traditionalists of the older generation. Many people like Hull and
Stimson, the old school, traditional statesmen of an earlier and arguably simpler era, saw
the entire New Deal shrouded in a suspicious Red aura. This carved a difficult terrain
that made walking the bureaucratic path exceedingly treacherous.
Other historians have touched upon the State Department and Cordell Hull’s
hostility to Morgenthau toward the end of the war and the culmination of Morgenthau’s
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activism for refugees. However, these historians have mostly fallen into two categories:
those who assume that Morgenthau deserved the hostility he received, and those who
argue that he fell victim to the State Department’s culture of anti-Semitism. However,
the documentary evidence points toward a third explanation for State’s apparent hostility
toward Morgenthau’s refugee relief efforts: the culture of fear and the suspicious reddish
aura.
In just one example, the State Department was obsessed in its ongoing pursuit of
any hint of communism, compiling lists and documents full of people with a suspicious
red aura about them. In fact, even ordinary liberals were tarred by their liberalism; in
their collective mind, the State Department associated “starry eyed” liberals (and
probably “starry-eyed” departments 93 ) with communists. It may be argued they were
surrounded by a suspicious aura of pink that the State Department found almost as
abhorrent. Later in this essay Morgenthau is revealed to have been a prime target for
State’s hostility on this front. He was certainly a target for Breckinridge Long’s hostility;
Long wrote in his diary on December 29, 1942, “My reputation, in some radical circles,
was challenged by adverse publicity – some of it as nasty as it was undeserved … The
attacks had their origin in Communistic and Jewish radical circles.” Long was quick to
assign blame, and he stereotypically connected radicals, communists, and people of
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Jewish faith. However, he was not the only one; in fact, that attitude was quite common
in the State Department. 94
Beyond this, Morgenthau and the entire concept of European refugee relief was
associated with people and organizations the State Department perceived to be radicals,
communists, and malcontents who had been “systematically attacking” the State
Department since 1936. This must have at the very least contributed to State’s distaste
for Morgenthau and his efforts. In short, the petrified State Department found itself
attacked in a nightmare of Orwellian proportion; and perhaps they were not so far off in
their assessment. For one, Harry Dexter White, Morgenthau’s Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, was outed as a spy during the McCarthy era; he was found to have been
communicating with Russian agents, a fact which caused Morgenthau great distress in the
early 1950’s. 95 Certainly, the State Department perceived an enemy at the gates—they
were convinced that refugee admission would provide enormous opportunities for Nazi
spies and communist revolutionaries. 96 In fact, late in 1943 after the rescue of Romanian
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Jews brought everything to a head, Breckinridge Long attempted to defend himself
before Congress on those very grounds; but Congress was not convinced. Cordell Hull
later insisted in his memoirs that Nazi infiltration of refugee immigration had posed a
serious threat. Historian Saul Friedman defended Hull in his History of the Holocaust by
explaining that, “Some officials like Hull … were honorable men who believed the only
way to stop the atrocities was winning the war.” 97
However even in the context of war this was nothing new; since the 1930’s the
State Department had prophesied doom with powerful rhetoric. The rhetoric had only
evolved to say the Nazi spies could contribute to Allied defeat while the Marxist
revolutionaries hoped to destroy Democracy, and by extension, the American way. 98
In an equally terrifying specter, the enemy was also within the gates in the form of
refugee organizations infested with people the State Department knew to be strong
communist sympathizers at the very least. In the eyes of the State Department, these
pestilential Communists (many of them Jewish!) were systematically waging war against
Freedom and Democracy and the American Way. It is in the midst of this State
Department culture of life-and-death ideology and hyperbolic rhetoric that Morgenthau
was faced with the problem of how to aid refugees—many or most of them Jewish. An
obsessive, gripping fear dominated State Department cognition where “Communists and
Radicals” were concerned. Could anyone really be trusted—especially a Jew in
have tried to force the Department to nullify existing immigration laws to permit entry of radicals,
ex-communists and other elements specifically barred from admission.”
97
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communication with refugee relief groups infested with the dreaded Communist scourge?
This was not an empirical proposition, but an underlying issue; a pattern of thought and
symbol permeating relations between the Democratic Self and the Communist Other.
When considered as a part of the structural confines within which they all operated, this
contextual fear helps to explain why State thwarted Morgenthau at every opportunity.
Again, one major contributing factor to this fear was the persistent and
documented attacks on the State Department. Whether real or perceived, these attacks
stretched back into the 1930’s. Because of such attacks on its policies and officials, the
State Department had been hotly and passionately defensive about the refugee issue for
years by the time Morgenthau’s transition from interested participant to ardent activist
was complete. Breckinridge Long wrote in his diary on December 29, 1942, obviously
regarding his success in barring the gates while innocent people died, “I have done my
duty to my country during the year. I have worked hard – very hard – and I have kept the
faith [although] my reputation, in some radical circles, was challenged by adverse
publicity – some of it as nasty as it was undeserved … [and] the attacks had their origin
in Communistic and Jewish radical circles.” Significantly, Morgenthau’s suspicion was
rising during this period Long felt attacked by Communists and Jews. Long was not
alone in his fear, and as time progressed, the State Department grew increasingly more
defensive and paranoid. By the time Pehle and Paul issued their Report to the Secretary
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on the Acquisition of This Government on the Murder of the Jews, State was at the end of
its figurative rope. 99
But what brought them there? Among other factors, the press contributed in no
small part to State’s obsession with being attacked. Certainly, it was true that the FDR
Administration enjoyed a complex and tense relationship with the press. But, while
many wings of the FDR administration faced criticism from the press, State’s relationship
with that institution of freedom was particularly strained. For example, Washington Post
journalist Drew Pearson’s column provides something of a divining rod; it is mentioned
multiple times in the Stimson, Morgenthau, and Hull Diaries. Out of these, Hull has the
most trouble. 100
In one fiery memo from September 1942, the unspecified author appears angry
that “Drew Pearson said in his column in the Washington Post about 10 days ago,
‘Secretary of State Cordell Hull has long been anti-Russian … [and] Mr. Hull…actually
would like to see Russia bled white.’” 101 Afterward, “Hull denounced these statements
as monstrous and diabolical falsehoods.” 102 Referring to the same incident, on
September 16, 1942, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the Division of
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Defense Materials writes about Pearson. Referring to Pearson’s allegations about the
State Department and synthetic rubber, he says “There is not the slightest truth in Mr.
Pearson’s statement with reference to the State Department.” 103 On another occasion in
1943, Henry Stimson recorded in his diary that Cordell Hull himself was petty and
unnecessarily upset about press jabs at the State Department. Stimson asserted that Hull
was “very abnormally insensitive.” 104
In May of ’44, Stimson discussed Pearson in his diary in the context of the
Morgenthau Plan for Postwar Germany, Morgenthau’s extremely punitive plan to
deindustrialize Germany and render it forever impotent. Stimson wrote,
Mr. Hull called me up evidently being very much worried over the
newspaper leaks in respect to the division in the Cabinet on the treatment
of Germany … Drew Pearson started it with a story last week which
evidently came from Treasury sources—at least it made attacks on Hull
and myself which no friend of ours would have made.
While Pearson clearly annoyed Stimson, his statement was free of the venom driving the
State Department’s outrage. In fact, Stimson blamed Treasury sources alongside
Pearson, which will be important later. It is not insignificant that while Pearson generally
berated the other departments, his column usually supported Morgenthau. 105
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For Stimson, Pearson was a bullying gossip. As a bothersome member of the
“long-haired” 106 press, he was just another gnat to be swatted. But for Hull, Pearson just
may have been the Devil himself. Moreover, Hull’s Devil was flanked by a demonic
army of newspapers and reporters—while Pearson provides just one salient example, the
problem of the press was persistent, and the State Department felt the strain most
severely. Deborah Lipstadt’s Beyond Belief, Laurel Leff’s Buried by the Times, and
Susan Tift’s and Alex Jones’ The Trust demonstrate the inadequate press response to the
Holocaust. But while the press response was one of overwhelming disbelief (and even a
stifling urge), any published news on any page was still far ahead of the State
Department’s categorical denial.
The situation is encapsulated in the following passage from a 1942 State
Department memo that begins,
Since Hitler’s accession to power in Germany in 1933 and especially since
the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 the Department of
State has been subjected to increasingly bitter attacks in the press
originating with communist and radical groups in the United States. …
Alleged failures … [included] … failure to take sides in the Spanish Civil
War and … not permitting all “refugees” to come to the United States.107
Notice, the “communists and radicals” appear together once again; these groups nearly
always appear together in the document and others like it. To the State Department, it
106

See Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Reel 8, Vol. 41, page 108.

107

Cordell Hull Papers, reel 55, folder 403, Campaign Against the Department of State.

Yancey 79
looked like they were all clearly in cahoots; Jews showed up later in the document. 108
Predictably, paralleling Breckinridge Long’s diary the same year, others in the paranoid
State Department revealed that all of the people they thought to be the “bad guys” were
connected.
Beyond the opening of the document quoted above, in the first ten pages of this
particular memo, there are eleven references to Hitler, the Axis, and Germany; in
contrast, there is absolutely no reference to the Holocaust. It is clear that the focus is not
on the suffering victims, but on any distant political threat their presence might possibly
pose. While it is true that in 1942 government officials still debated the existence of
Hitler’s actual genocide, by that time concentration camps and pervasive persecution
were already undeniably documented in the press and through refugee reports. Yet, there
is no mention of what created the flood of refugees whom the so-called “communists and
radicals” sought to admit. The focus is entirely on the political and ideological leanings
of the would-be rescuers; the document speaks for itself. In contrast to two mentions of
refugees, three of Hitler, two of Axis governments, and six of Germany, there are fiftyseven references to communists, radicals, Marxists, revolutionaries. This “so-called
liberal and intellectual fringe of Marxist revolutionaries” terrified the State Department
with their refugee rescue efforts (note, the word “refugee” was in quotations in the memo,
as if the plight of victims were merely imagined). Unfortunately, this attitude persisted
and prevailed in State Department dealings with refugee issues until 1944.
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For example, in a series of reports issued from 1942 to 1944, the State
Department continues to be alarmed by the efforts of “liberals, progressives, and …
communists” to undermine their immigration policy. Theirs was such a consuming and
deterministic fear that virtually anyone involved in refugee relief was presumed
communist; relief organizations were automatically suspect. In Campaign Against the
Department of State, the author, an unnamed State Department official, admits, “True,
many distinguished liberals occasionally were attracted to these groups by
misrepresentation,” but they were obviously misled by the hardened communists 109 . It
also appears that their mere association taints them, as we will explore later. Despite
enormous evidence to the contrary, the State Department remained convinced refugee
relief organizations and the individuals involved with them were attempting to sneak
communists and radicals into the U.S.A. under the guise of refugees. This compounded
with State’s persistent fear that the Nazis would send spies into the U.S. through channels
established for the relief of refugees. While this particular fear sprang more from State’s
deterministic fear than from reality (almost without exception, Axis spies never posed as
refugees), that did not make it any less potent. To summarize, in the 1942 document
titled Adverse Record of Certain Signers of Telegram on Some Visa Cases, the
Department summarized its position.
The visa procedures and practices of the Department of State have been
predicated upon the assumption that the enemies of our form of
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Government would be likely to attempt from time to time the infiltration
of their subversive agents into the United States. 110
Any attack on these restrictive visa procedures was perceived as an attack not just on the
law or the State Department, but also on the very fabric of American democracy. After
all, State went to great lengths to paint refugee relief organizations and associated
individuals as communists, and communists and radicals were always appeared to be
attacking the American Way.
It is likely that State found Morgenthau guilty by association with refugee relief
groups, and the more persistent he was—the more activist he became—the more
threatening and sinister his actions and motives appeared to the already oversensitive
State Department. This helps explain why they thwarted him at every turn. He was
situated in their consciousness with people like Rabbi Wise—Morgenthau Sr.’s old and
dear friend—who was quite notorious in the State Department himself because of his
staunch support of refugees, and whose son was on several lists of suspected communists,
enemies and attackers of the State Department. These associations diminished
Morgenthau’s likelihood of accomplishing significant changes in refugee policy, and
explain why it was necessary for the Treasury to resort to an appeal to the President.
While Morgenthau was operating from within the cabinet and should have been seen as
legitimate and friendly, State’s perceptions were already too warped to be objective about
the refugee issue. In a document dated October 23, 1942, State asserted its belief that all
the organizations attacking the State Department (mostly refugee relief organizations
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already “proved” rife with communist radicals), were revealed to be thoroughly
interconnected. The language in the document’s opening paragraph is quite strong.
[We are] concerned with certain organizations of so-called American
liberals and intellectuals who have been attacking officers of the State
Department for several years. By a system of interlocking directorates, all
these mushroom organizations will be found to be connected…[and]…in
spite of the professed opposition to Communists by these organizations,
their smear campaigns are practically identical with those of the
communists as are their targets. 111
The following report takes the tone of an Orwellian nightmare: “they” are coming!
“They” are set out to destroy “us;” they are already here. While “It [was] conceded that
since September 1939 the majority of these persons [had] actively opposed and still
oppose[d] the American Communist Party” 112 for its association with then Axis-Allied
Russia, State could not believe the proverbial leopard capable of “changing its spots.”
No, “They still desire the abolition of the capitalist system and in its stead a modified
form of Bolshevism,” [emphasis added]. 113
It follows that Morgenthau’s association with the organized Jewish community
and its relief efforts, and his communication with other relief organizations may have
combined to make him a prime target for suspicion even before Treasury staff began
investigating the State Department failure to help refugees.
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There is little evidence that Cordell Hull or State Department officials explicitly
expected Morgenthau himself to purposefully sneak communists disguised as Holocaust
victims under their noses. That sounds like a somewhat ludicrous proposition. The
reality is much more subtle: there was a pervasive organizational culture of fear and
suspicion at work in the State Department, and its reach extended even to the Secretary of
the Treasury. Not only does this theme weave through the numerous documents in the
Hull Diaries, even several years later, Hull feels it is important enough to justify in his
memoirs. 114 Significantly, it was this culture of fear that initially crippled Morgenthau’s
efforts to save Holocaust victims. The perceived threat of Nazis and communists
infiltrating the ranks of “legitimate” refugees made the State Department oversensitive to
Morgenthau’s efforts, and his Jewish background predisposed them to suspect he was
overly influenced by identification with the victims. In fact, according to Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, this is what made Morgenthau feel justified in functioning as a
“second Secretary of State.” 115
The relationship between Morgenthau and Cordell Hull is particularly interesting
when examined in its larger context, including that of the State Department’s bizarre
relationship with the refugee relief community. As argued in the chapter covering
Morgenthau’s unlikely path to activism, Hull was not entirely responsible for the
bureaucratic shuffling and messes made in the State Department. His undersecretaries
often acted without his consent or even his knowledge, despite Hull’s assertion to the

114
115

Hull, Cordell, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1539.
Hull, Cordell, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1539.

Yancey 84
contrary in his memoirs. 116 In a January 12,1944 meeting discussing refugee evacuation,
Morgenthau encapsulated the problem. Morgenthau told Pehle and Harry White about
Hull’s relationship with the people in charge of refugees, saying, “Long came in, then in
came Reigelman, then three other people in the State Department came in. I turned to
Mr. Hull and said, ‘Would you mind introducing me to these people, because I am sorry,
I don’t know who they are.’” After explaining that the men in question were Travers,
who was in charge of the Visa Division, and Reams, who was political adviser on
refugees, Morgenthau dropped the bomb, “And these two people – Hull say[s], ‘I don’t
even know who they are.’ And there was complete disorder. Breckinridge Long was
ashen color; his hands shook. I never saw the man so thoroughly scared.” Morgenthau
went on, “And Hull just didn’t seem – one time I said, ‘You know, when you go through
this record for the last year and a half, it is one of the most shocking, upsetting matters I
have ever come into contact with.’” Morgenthau finished by summing up the situation,
“Here are these people handling this thing for him, and he doesn’t even know them by
sight. It is just unbelievable.” 117
Furthermore, Hull actually admitted to Stimson in 1945 that he had been unable to
control his undersecretaries and they “had been responsible for the row over Argentina”
while he was in the hospital for seven months. 118 The astute Stimson noticed this, and
encapsulated the problem in his diary one day, talking about what was
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In my opinion a very serious problem … but to my utter surprise when I
opened it up with Hull I found that he hadn’t given it any consideration at
all. He did not even know that he had written such a letter asking my
views on the question. He had signed the letter, he said, just as he signed
hundreds of others and had left all the work of framing up this question to
his underlings. In other words, the most important kind of foreign policy
is being virtually put in a position where the question is settled by the
underlings of our State Department instead of receiving first the ideas and
views of the President and his cabinet and his Secretary of State. 119
This was indeed a serious problem. However, the extenuating circumstances of
his persevering at the job through his extreme illness, and Hull’s staunch faith in his
undersecretaries, combined to make him more bystander than perpetrator, some things, to
quote Stimson, simply “slipped through his hands.” 120

VALUES IN TRANSITION: THE RELATIONAL ASPECT

Before Hull came to see Morgenthau as a refugee advocate and de facto assailant
of the fortress that was the State Department, they worked together with as much
harmony as was to be expected of two such vastly different men. Even when they were
friendly, Hull and Morgenthau never quite seemed to “speak the same language,” because
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they were, essentially, from two different worlds. In fact, their struggles may be seen as
symptomatic of a larger pattern of values in transition.
FDR’s New Deal was indeed a great departure from the past, and his New Dealers
were no less so. The old and the new clashed often on this frontier of two centuries,
where men formed in completely different eras tried to work together and understand
each other. It was a borderland of ideas, and pairs of competing dualisms—youth and
age, idealism and experience, innovation and tradition—all created tension in the FDR
administration that needs to be explored. While intergenerational struggles obviously
stretch backwards for millennia, those experienced in the FDR administration were
arguably a more radical departure than many that had gone before them. The struggles
within the FDR administration were more than those between young men and their
fathers’ peers; they were epic struggles between disparate worlds. These men were
enmeshed in a violent ideological confrontation between the fading nineteenth century
and rising twentieth. They all felt the tension inherent in the sweeping, rapid changes
that World War I and World War II engendered; for many, the wars and the Holocaust
would come to represent the failure of the Enlightenment Progress that the older
generation cherished. Inevitably, people do not operate in a vacuum; they operate from
within the vast worlds inside their heads. These inner worlds spill unstoppable into the
outer one, the actual day-to-day progress of events, and this particular intergenerational
tension became a treacherous undertow that Morgenthau and his colleagues had to swim
in. This intergenerational tension between men of the ebbing Victorian 19th century and
oncoming modern 20th century colored Morgenthau’s relationships within the Cabinet
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and influenced the course of events as much as FDR’s administrative style or the State
Department’s paranoid complex about Communism.
Before proceeding into such dangerous theoretical territory (where, in the words
of the old maps, there be dragons) the specific nature of some of the relationships
involved must be examined. The relationships between Morgenthau, Hull, and Stimson
provide the best examples of the intergenerational struggle that colored relations within
the Cabinet.
Clues into their relationship are found in Hull’s Memoirs, where he writes about
Morgenthau’s attacking the State Department:
Naturally the more extreme sympathizers [with the Jewish refugees] in
this country, especially among the Jews, and some in high positions such
as Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, found grievous fault with the
State Department and especially with every official handling the refugee
problem. It was but natural that, in their anguish over the projected
extermination of their race in Europe, they should feel that even the
strenuous efforts we were making were inadequate. 121
It is obvious that even at this late date Hull is either still ignorant or is
purposefully sanitizing for history. However, his initial ignorance, documented in the
previous chapter, indicates the former.
Within the Roosevelt administration, there was already a great deal of conflict and
competition owing simply to FDR’s administrative style. Several historians have
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discussed this in several contexts, and that historiography has already been explored in
this thesis. However, it is helpful at this point to revisit these issues and allow the key
players to speak for themselves.
Henry Stimson’s diary sheds a great deal of light on the administrative style of
FDR, and Stimson’s insights are readily applicable to the Morgenthau situation. Stimson
found FDR’s leadership style to be highly disorganized in general; this and other factors
made the climate in the cabinet quite tense at times. However, a close analysis of
Stimson’s own relationship with Morgenthau reveals that it went sour not because of any
lingering issues in the Cabinet, the administrative style of FDR, or even because of the
Morgenthau Plan, as some argue.
Although these were certainly contributing factors, they were certainly not the
contributing factor. Something else was at work. These same elements were present in
Stimson’s relationship with Hull, but did not affect it negatively. Conversely, the
Stimson-Morgenthau relationship went downhill as Morgenthau’s differences from his
older peers become more visibly salient. The more active he became in the refugee issue,
the more he stepped out of his traditional Treasury boundaries. Personally, he moved
further from the staid, responsible, old school way of doing things. The crucial moment
was one seemingly insignificant incident that was actually quite pivotal: Morgenthau
told Stimson a “little white lie” about the Morgenthau Plan for postwar Germany that
seems to have been the proverbial “last straw” for Stimson. After this point, Stimson had
little or nothing good to say about Morgenthau. Stimson wrote in his diary on Tuesday,
March 29, 1945, “at a luncheon with me in the White House [Morgenthau] spoke of this
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paper as something that had been put over on him in Quebec and which he had never
fathered. I had a copy of it in my pocket, fished it out, and showed his initials at the
bottom of it. Then he said he had made a great mistake and has admitted that with great
frankness since. Then, for a little while, Morgenthau was in the doghouse and the State
Department resumed its proper functions.” It is very significant that in the same diary
entry Stimson actually blamed FDR’s administrative style and Hull’s illness for allowing
the Morgenthau Plan to be bandied about; conversely, he did not blame Morgenthau for
spawning the idea to begin with. Stimson wrote, “Never has anything which I have
witnessed in the last four years shown such instance of the bad effect of our chaotic
administration and its utter failure to treat matters in a well organized way.” He
continued, “Hull, although essentially on my side, was too indecisive and ill to take much
of any position.” Stimson talked about Morgenthau next, recording how someone in the
Treasury had leaked the plan to the press where “It was at once torn to pieces by public
opinion and the President hastily retreated from his position.”

Stimson doesn’t seem to

mind that so much; and he certainly doesn’t blame Morgenthau. Stimson had noted in
previous months that Morgenthau was justifiably angry, but he did not judge him harshly
for it. If anything, Stimson wrote it off as an overly passionate lapse by someone who
really did not have the economic training to understand the consequences. It seems that
Morgenthau’s relative youth and inexperience got him off the hook. It was the lie that
Stimson honed in on, and it was the lie that made him angry. In the end, perhaps it was
the lie that spoiled their rapport, as well. 122
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In the months that followed, Stimson’s references to Morgenthau in his diary
grew exponentially more negative, disdainful, and dismissive. They were a sharp
contrast to the pleasantly professional entries Stimson made about Morgenthau before the
lie, even after he had found out about the Morgenthau Plan! By May 8th, Stimson wrote
scathingly of Morgenthau’s interrupting his lunchtime rest “troubled because the
Coordinating Committee is not carrying out his ‘scorched earth’ policy quite as hard as
he wants it carried.” May 9th, Stimson noted, “We have run into the stubborn opposition
of Morgenthau who is afraid that the least little bit of the ‘scorched earth’ policy towards
Germany will be relaxed. I foresee hideous results from his influence in the future.” By
July, Stimson referred to Morgenthau with an openly disgusted tone and poked fun at
him, something he had not done before. Stimson related a conversation with a colleague
from the State Department where, “Henry Morgenthau was on the prowl and was going
to turn up in Germany ‘just on the chance that he might be needed.’” Stimson wrote,
“Apparently he has done this on his own. Byrnes and I laughed over it together.”
Stimson painted quite a word picture of Morgenthau: “Stubborn,” and “troubled” because
he didn’t get his policy “quite as hard as he wants it” conjures up an image of a
recalcitrant child. Morgenthau’s finally being “on the prowl” is a typically feminine,
feline image. Perhaps Morgenthau’s lie and unrestrained passion for vengeance on
Germany combined to feminize him in Stimson’s mind. In Stimson’s mind, perhaps the
already younger, less experienced New-Dealer had effectively severed all symbolic ties
with the version of masculinity that Stimson cherished. This was in fact part of a larger

Yancey 91
pattern of events; it was simply the proverbial last straw that finally irreparably smashed
Stimson’s image of Morgenthau. 123
The souring of the relationship between Stimson and Morgenthau perfectly
illustrates the tensions between FDR’s comparatively youthful New-Dealers and older,
more experienced statesmen like Hull and Stimson. This was a battle not over politics, or
for FDR’s favor, but an inevitable struggle between youth and age, idealism and
experience, past and future. At its most essential level, theirs was a conflict between
nineteenth and twentieth-century men in what was rapidly becoming a postmodern world,
and this, too, would complicate Morgenthau’s attempts at rescue.
Who were the men involved, and what made them so different from one another?
Hull and Stimson were both veterans of the Spanish American War and Stimson attained
the rank of Colonel fighting in France in World War I; Morgenthau was seven years old
during the Spanish American War and spent World War I working for the Farm
Administration. Hull won the Nobel Peace Prize; Morgenthau came up with an
infamously Carthaginian “peace” plan for the postwar deconstruction of Germany. Hull
grew up in a log cabin in Reconstruction era Tennessee and went on to become “The
Father of the United Nations.” Stimson left his privileged life in New England to
experience the last of the American frontier mapping a part of Montana and living with
American Indians. He spent several years in the Philippines and Nicaragua. Morgenthau
grew up in a brownstone in twentieth-century Manhattan, spent time with his father,
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Ambassador Morgenthau, in Turkey. 124 In 1913, Morgenthau became a farmer in
Duchess County, New York, where he began fortuitous friendship with his neighbor FDR
that propelled him into, first agricultural bureaucracy, and finally, the Treasury. His
scope of experience was considerably different from that of Hull and Stimson. This was
no ordinary generation gap.
That is not to say that Morgenthau was better or worse than the other two. He
was neither; he was merely different. For men of Morgenthau’s generation, there were
no majestic American mountain ranges yet unmapped; there was no more frontier to
experience. Morgenthau, like Stimson and Hull, was inevitably a product of his own
times. The question remains, how did these differences manifest themselves in the dayto-day experience of Cabinet life? The Old School and the New Guard, solid tradition
and ad hoc innovation, experience and idealism, the 19th and 20th centuries—all of these
elements clashed in varied and subtle ways every single day.
At the most basic level was age. Stimson was born in New York in 1867. Hull
was born in Tennessee in 1871. Morgenthau was born in New York in 1891. From the
get-go, these men were different. Hull was born into rural Southern poverty. Stimson
was born into a New York just a few years removed from the infamous Civil War Draft
Riots, into an era captured by Louisa May Alcott. Morgenthau was born in the New
York of Edith Wharton and Henry James. There was really no comparison.
In one passage that seems to crystallize his outlook and sense of masculinity,
Stimson spoke simply and stirringly about his experience on the frontier. He mapped the
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part of Montana that would become Glacier National Park. He hunted and climbed with
the Blackfoot People and came to know their ways. Stimson himself believed that his
“contact with the simple rough men of the wilderness, both red and white,” whom he
clearly admired, played a great role in shaping him. This was the man who would have to
deal with the petty bureaucratic messes in FDR’s Cabinet. Stimson wrote in his memoirs,
Looking back, I find it hard to exaggerate the effect of these [wilderness]
experiences on my later life. That effect, physical, mental, and moral, was
great. Not only is self confidence gained by such a life, but ethical
principles tend to become simpler by the impact of the wilderness and by
contact with the men who live in it. Moral problems are divested of the
confusion and complications which civilization throws around them.
Selfishness cannot be easily concealed, and the importance of courage,
truthfulness, and frankness is increased. To a certain extent, the effect is
similar to the code of honor learned by the soldier in the field. 125
Stimson’s value system was hopelessly at odds with that of the Roosevelt administration.
Competitive adhocracy, Roosevelt’s maintenance of near-divine control, and the dirty
bureaucratic squabbles that characterized the administration—these were distasteful to
Stimson, and arguably to many men of his persuasion and generation. Stimson’s distaste
for the atmosphere of Roosevelt’s administration and his disapproval of some of its
younger officials were merely symptomatic of the inevitable conflict between two such
disparate worlds.
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In the early years of their work together, Stimson and Morgenthau got along
splendidly. Morgenthau had warmly welcomed him into FDR’s administration when he
joined the Cabinet ranks, and Stimson liked him for it and considered him a personal
friend. Stimson had probably needed a friend; he was in a uniquely challenging position
as a Republican from an old Republican family entering a powerful office in the
administration of a liberal Democrat. At any rate, most of their correspondence was
characterized by cordiality and professionalism; certainly Morgenthau’s entries about
Stimson were unremarkably professional. However, it is not insignificant that
Morgenthau seems to have amused Stimson quite a bit. In one example from the
November of 1942, Stimson talked about the developments with Vichy France that had
created “much excitement in the starry-eyed circles” of “ardent young gentlemen” in the
Cabinet, including Morgenthau. At Felix Frankfurter’s birthday party, Stimson took it
upon himself to diffuse their worries over Vichy, including the task of calming “poor
Henry” down. “Finally,” Stimson said, “After grunts and groans we got Morgenthau into
line and I think I sent them home reconciled.” Stimson assigned himself the role of
kindly, understanding father figure and dealt with his traumatized bureaucratic children
accordingly. Clearly, Morgenthau and the other “ardent young gentlemen” must have
held at least some notion of deference to their perception of his greater age, experience,
and wisdom, because they let him do it. 126
Two weeks later, on November 29th, Stimson again took the edge off of a
“delicate situation” with Henry Morgenthau, this time involving the appointment of a
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Treasury Advisor to England. Morgenthau had chosen someone that the War Department
did not entirely approve of. However, Stimson “naturally [didn’t] want to offend him for
not only is he the representative of the Treasury but he has always been a good friend of
mine.” Stimson pondered the issue, but was still troubled three days later when
Morgenthau called him as he had not been able to make a decision that, presumably,
would suit everyone. Morgenthau wanted Stimson to hurry up the process. The next
day, Stimson wrote in his diary that he was “sorry to say I had an unpleasant talk with
Henry,” who had “wanted to put in one of his own young men.” Stimson, by contrast,
wanted to put in “an outstanding financier economist who would be recognized as such
and would be able to meet the British on even terms.” Stimson had a frank talk (in line
with Stimson’s self-styled frontier values of directness and honesty) with Morgenthau
and told him he was going to pick the experienced man. However, Stimson said
Morgenthau was “jealous” of the Wall Street types and was consequently “crabbed”
about it. Seen through Stimson’s eyes, Morgenthau’s action looks quite childish. It
appears that perhaps the invisible forces of youth and idealism versus age and experience
had struck again. 127
It is important to note at this juncture that word Stimson’s word choices were not
accidental. In an era dominated by Emily Post, ladies and gentlemen wrote letters and
were judged by the handwriting with which they were written. For people from a world
of text messages, email, and word processors that allow for ready deletion, it is easy to
miss the importance of this concept. Morgenthau’s meeting minutes demonstrated the
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preoccupation with linguistic subtlety as well. In an eight-man meeting of the Fiscal and
Monetary Advisory Board, Morgenthau, Hopkins, and others argued over the
construction of a simple memo to the President. The word “such” was discussed at
length, with four different people chiming in to argue over shades of meaning. No one
was shocked; clearly, sometimes it took a village to draft a memo, because preoccupation
with linguistic perfection was a characteristic of the era in which these men lived. As a
student at Andover in the 1880’s, which Stimson said played a great role in forming him,
he would have learned the power of his pen and the significance of a well turned phrase.
When Stimson used words like “ardent young gentlemen” and labeled behavior
“childish,” it is likely that he meant it. 128
That said, as Morgenthau became more activist in nature and rebelled against his
prescribed role in the Cabinet (albeit a rebellion sanctified by FDR’s bizarre
administrative style) his relationship with Stimson grew more complicated. Despite the
complications, Stimson still liked and respected Morgenthau. As Morgenthau learned
more and more the extent of the Holocaust and advocated more and more drastic
measures in the form of the Morgenthau Plan, Stimson worried about him. Stimson
condemned Germany just as Morgenthau did; he thought “it represent[ed] the ruin of a
most powerful and efficient nation which ha[d] wrecked itself by its own failure in
morals and [was] now suffering the terrific penance that goes with terrific cruelty.”
However, Stimson wholeheartedly disagreed with Morgenthau’s draconian plan; he
thought it was “childish folly.” Yet, for a long time Morgenthau remained a “good
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friend,” according to Stimson. Eventually, Morgenthau completely disappointed him,
and it was the intergenerational tensions and competing values between the old and new
that soured the relationship. Again, it was the “little white lie” that Morgenthau told
Stimson that changed things. It must have seemed inconsequential for Morgenthau, but
was perhaps pivotal for Stimson. It was a question of competing values, and the new
must have seemed a glaring contrast to ethical sensibility Stimson credited the frontier
with giving him. Likewise, the older paradigm must have seemed outdated and
inconsequential to Morgenthau, or he probably would not have breached it. 129
Stimson has to be understood in the context of his own explicitly stated beliefs
about the mentalité of his morality and masculinity. Again, Stimson claimed to be
foundationally influenced by the “ethical principles … of the wilderness …[where] moral
problems are divested of the confusion and complications which civilization throws
around them. Selfishness cannot be easily concealed, and the importance of courage,
truthfulness, and frankness is increased.” To such a person, the complications and
contradictions of a more modern, twentieth-century sensibility may indeed have appeared
to be petty jealousies, and childish vindictiveness. That is certainly not to say that
Morgenthau was either childish or petty, only to say that these were vastly different men.
Stimson was indisputably Morgenthau’s superior in age and experience, and Morgenthau
must have known it. Conflict was inevitable, and it came. During one week in May
1944, Stimson recorded two small incidents where he perceives Morgenthau to behave
jealously and to shirk responsibility. After this, their relationship rested rather
129

“Childish folly” quote from Hodgson, Godfrey, The Colonel: The life and Wars of Henry
Stimson, 1867-1950, page 18.

Yancey 98
precariously on a slippery slope where their competing worldviews threatened the
balance. 130
On August 26, Stimson noticed in Morgenthau “a very bitter atmosphere of
personal resentment against the entire German people without regard to individual guilt,”
that worried him. A week later, Stimson attributed it to the fact that “Morgenthau is, not
unnaturally, very bitter as he is not thoroughly trained in history or even economics.”
Significantly, Stimson blamed Morgenthau’s lack of experience, not his ethnicity. They
talked it over with “temperateness,” and Stimson was satisfied. 131
A month later, “it became very evident that Morgenthau had been rooting around
behind the scenes and had greased the way for his own views by conference with the
President and others.” A nasty picture, Stimson was thoroughly disenchanted with
Morgenthau. He registered his complaint against the Morgenthau Plan in his diary,
saying, “I feel I need to leave a record for history that the entire government of this
Administration had not run amuck at this vital period.” In the months that followed,
Stimson’s writings about Morgenthau grew increasingly more stern. By September, the
Morgenthau Plan had created such a disturbance in the government, and in Stimson’s
own mind, that he recorded: it was a “diatribe,” it was “biased” and finally, Stimson was
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“horrified with the Carthaginian attitude of the Treasury. It is Semitism gone wild for
vengeance.” 132
Historians often quote this phrase; Michael Beschloss’ The Conquerors and
Jeffrey K. Olick’s In the House of the Hangman: the Agonies of German Defeat just to
name a few. For example, Beschloss sees this as anti-Semitic rhetoric, but perhaps it was
something else. It is obviously offensive and inflammatory, yes, but it may leave a
somewhat misleading impression of Stimson if the negative is all that readers get to see.
My reading of the documents, while far from exhaustive, has not revealed him to have
been particularly racist; Stimson had in fact spoken fairly sensitively, for a man of his
generation and socioeconomic status, about race relations in North Africa. More
significantly, he had only the highest praise and an obvious admiration for the Blackfoot
People of Montana. Stimson also seemed to have had a similarly high opinion of women;
after he pinned on her Distinguished Service Medal, Stimson told Mrs. Oveta Culp
Hobby, Director of the Women’s Army Corps, he said “The only trouble was that there
weren’t more of her.” Stimson was born in 1867, yes, but these are certainly not the
sentiments of a Victorian racist. It is likely that an actual bigot born in 1867 would have
left a much darker evidentiary trail, perhaps more akin to that of Breckinridge Long. 133
Only nine days previously to recording his now-infamous remark, Stimson wrote
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in his diary of a conversation he had with Felix Frankfurter on the matter of the
Morgenthau Plan. Stimson seemed to want to make it clear that he was judging
Morgenthau on the basis of his overemotional disregard for the rule of law; in its proper
context, Stimson’s complaint does not appear rooted in Morgenthau’s ethnicity. Stimson
Asked [Frankfurter] to come to dinner for a conference so that I might
enlist him in this battle. Frankfurter was very helpful as I knew he would
be. Although a Jew like Morgenthau, he approached this subject with
perfect detachment and great helpfulness. I went over the whole matter
from the beginning with him, reading him Morgenthau’s views on the
subject of the Ruhr and also on the subject of the trial of the Nazis, at both
of which he snorted with astonishment and disdain. He was very helpful
in regard to the trials because he had sat in the Supreme court on the
opinion that t hey had rendered in the saboteurs’ case and was very
familiar with the subject of the ‘common law of war offenses;’ He fully
backed up my views and those of my fellows in the Army that we must
give these men the substance of a fair trial and that they cannot be
railroaded to their death without trial.
Two weeks later, Stimson discussed the matter with President Roosevelt, telling
him it was the outrageous language of Morgenthau’s Plan which had most alarmed him.
Stimson recalled the conversation,
In the course of the talk I told him of my personal friendship for Henry
Morgenthau who had been so kind to me when I first came into the
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Cabinet and that I had shuddered when he took the leadership in such a
campaign against Germany, knowing how a man of his race would be
misrepresented for so doing. 134
Perhaps Stimson’s now infamous comment was simply a frustrated outburst at a
man in whom he had lost faith; Stimson may have merely been judging Morgenthau for
his “failure” to maintain Stimson’s own view of masculinity. Stimson obviously had
perceived in Morgenthau several instances of uncontrolled emotion, departures from
deified Tradition, “petty jealousies,” and the like. It appears that Stimson was judging
Morgenthau for being a man of a different generation and masculine ideal than himself.
Frankfurter, on the other hand, while he was also younger, was from the Old World.
Furthermore, he had much more in common with Stimson; born in Vienna, he had
become Stimson’s assistant in 1906; both men were dignified attorneys of the ancient
persuasion.
At any rate, Anti-Semitism does not seem to have been the problem. The issue at
stake was more likely Stimson’s personal beliefs about the manhood of Morgenthau’s
generation. Morgenthau and men like him seemed to Stimson not just younger, but
softer, more emotional, less traditional, and less restrained. Whether Stimson’s beliefs
about Morgenthau were or were not grounded is irrelevant; they were true for Stimson
and they influenced how Stimson dealt with Morgenthau and, consequently, how
effectively Morgenthau could accomplish his goals when working with Stimson.
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Perhaps Morgenthau’s plan had served to highlight the differences between the two men
and their competing world views; their generationally influenced understanding of how
the world works and who they should be as men in it.
Like many people, Stimson had often demonstrated a preference for the mores of
those whose mores closely paralleled his own. In December of 1943, Stimson was
pondering the North African Campaign. Stimson had been dealing presumably with
junior members of the department on the issue and felt it was “high time” to talk “with
General Stanley Embick, who is the head of our elder statesmen in military matters.”
Stimson’s words positively glowed as he warmly described:
Embick was an old classmate of mine in the General Staff College in the
old days of the last war. He is a fine old fellow but he belongs to the
classical school and McCloy has suspicions of him for that reason. I on
the contrary feel that it is very important to find the sound foundations for
what we do even with the new machinery and the new methods, and I
always find myself refreshed as to vision and outlook by a talk with
him. 135
Stimson clearly felt the past was a sound foundation; he valued that which was
reliably hardened by experience and time. As a generality of Stimson’s outlook, this
sentiment also extended to agencies; recall Stimson’s appropriation of Hull’s label
“Starry-eyed departments,” where, presumably, there lurked starry-eyed young
communists-by-association. In February of 1943, Stimson complained about the civilian
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agencies represented at a meeting on civilian policy in occupied territories. Morgenthau’s
young friend Harry White (25 years younger than Stimson) was representing the
Treasury. Stimson complained “that the several civilian agencies concerned are
approaching the problem from the ‘idealistic’ viewpoint of improving conditions
throughout the world rather than from a realistic viewpoint.” 136 The idea that idealism
was inherently unrealistic was characteristic of Stimson’s occasionally antiquarian,
uppercrust outlook. And, while the Morgenthau Plan cannot be said to have suffered
from positive idealism in any form, it was suffering from an inherently “unrealistic”
submission to raw emotion; the connection is that both unrestrained idealism and emotion
are incompatible with Stimson’s rather Victorian manhood.
Clearly they affected Morgenthau’s working relationship with Stimson, but how
did the clash of dated ideals between men of different generations affect Morgenthau’s
relationship with Cordell Hull? The tension between Hull and Morgenthau looks on the
surface to be the result of an inflated turf war, but a deeper analysis reveals that it is
plagued by the same intergenerational tensions between Morgenthau and Stimson. The
ebbing 19th century ideas and oncoming 20th century world seemed locked in a battle for
the Cabinet.
Generally, Stimson and the War Department minded their own business—and
they certainly had enough to manage on their own—and let Hull manage foreign policy
and Morgenthau manage finance. Morgenthau, however, was notorious for invading the
turf of the State Department, and Cordell Hull. This made Hull furious; yet Hull and the
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State Department did the very same thing to Stimson on a regular basis! Partly, FDR’s
tendency toward departure from tradition was a contributing factor. In one example from
February of 1943, Stimson attempted to correct what he believed was FDR’s error in
assigning the general administration of civilian affairs in North Africa to the State
Department. Stimson wrote, “He [FDR] has done this in disregard of the talk I had with
him over the telephone in which I pointed out the historical precedents of our government
which in past wars has invariably used the War Department as that agency.” Note, it was
the violation of historical precedent which assumed primacy in Stimson’s complaint. The
fact that “The State Department of course has never been an administrative department.
It has no machinery for that purpose,” arguably a more serious obstacle to effective
administration, came only as an afterthought. At any rate, State was able to encroach
upon War Department territory partly because of FDR’s unapologetic departure from
historical precedent; this is ad hoc innovation at work affronting the deified Tradition.
Yet, Stimson still claimed to “have no hard feeling against the State Department of
course, particularly not against Hull,” because the State Department was notoriously bad
at administration. The State Department’s foreign staff “consist[ed] of ambassadors and
ministers and consular agencies, none of which do anything except write and talk.” 137
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Stimson definitely felt that FDR had given the State Department too much power.
However, the State Department was also taking over territory assigned to it by neither
statute nor tradition. Stimson was incredibly disturbed by this new “departure from
traditions of our American government in respect to military matters which have been
fundamental since the origin of our government,” and he told Hull so. Stimson
constantly looked backward to tradition for guidance. Hull had “violated” it, and
Stimson was seriously concerned. Yet, his relationship with Hull remained constant.
Stimson seemed to respect Hull, despite his perception of Hull’s “anxiety,”
“peevishness,” “weekly diatribes,” and administrative violation of tradition. Why? 138
To further complicate the situation, there was also the matter of Hull’s illness.
Stimson noted in his diary that Hull had grown quite cantankerous by the end of FDR’s
third administration. However, Stimson was patient with Hull. One afternoon at the end
of a particularly trying week, Stimson described Hull as “finishing up his usual weekly
diatribe on his troubles, amusingly serious as to what the ‘cherubs’ were trying to do to
him.” Stimson was amused; he seemed to understand Hull, for they were “of an age.”
While their youthful experience was different, they had experience and generation in
common. Plus, Hull was a self-made man, a concept that was very important to notions
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of masculinity for men of Hull and Stimson’s generation. Also, there were a few more
extenuating circumstances. 139
Very significantly, Hull had grown increasingly sicker as his tuberculosis and
diabetes worsened. Like many people of his generation, he also had chronic dental
problems. In 1943, on the plane to Russia to negotiate with Stalin, Hull’s tuberculosis
was affecting him so much that he was actually coughing bright red blood into his
handkerchief. This was a very sick man on a very important mission that took a great
deal of grit; but Hull persevered and succeeded in winning Stalin’s trust because he
believed the fate of the free world might be at stake. Hull reportedly told Stalin “The
responsibility for whether the world crashes to pieces or is saved will be laid at your
doors.” Despite his illness and the fact that FDR consistently excluded him in favor of
Sumner Welles, a great deal of weight fell onto Hull’s shoulders. 140
It bears consideration that two of the most common symptoms of chronic
tuberculosis are extreme fatigue and pain with breathing; chronic pain is known to take a
heavy toll on a person’s body, mind, and spirit. His chronic illness (and presumably also
his chronic pain) had to lower Hull’s tolerance for the mundane annoyances of
bureaucratic life. It must also have made Henry Morgenthau’s incursions onto his turf all
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the more intolerable, and the fresh New Dealer all the more difficult for a statesman of
Hull’s generation to put up with. 141
In the midst of Hull’s illness, with his undersecretaries running amuck,
Morgenthau began acting, as Hull recorded for posterity in his Memoirs,
As if he were clothed in authority to project himself into the field of
foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course of foreign policy
… despite the fact that he was not at all fully or accurately informed on a
number of questions of foreign policy with which he undertook to
interfere … Emotionally upset by Hitler’s rise and his persecution of the
Jews, he often sought to induce the President to anticipate the State
Department or act contrary to our better judgment.
Hull was understandably upset. However, Hull may not have been in a position to
accurately judge the situation himself. He was nearly an invalid, he was often out of
touch, and some of his underlings were acting diabolically. However, upon close
analysis, it was not the interference that so upset Hull—after all, overlapping jurisdictions
were characteristic of the administration, and Hull spent some of his own time snagging
Stimson’s turf. 142 More significantly, Hull took issue with Morgenthau’s interference as
an “emotional” issue. To Hull, Morgenthau appeared “emotionally upset by Hitler’s
rise.” For a man of Hull’s generation, strong emotions were best exhibited by women
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and children, not grown men; they were certainly inappropriate for the Secretary of the
Treasury of the United States. Emotions were not to be trusted; reason was to be trusted,
and Morgenthau’s refugee efforts seemed most unreasonable to Hull, who remained
convinced that the only way to help refugees was to win the war. Therefore, to Hull, it
may not have seemed entirely necessary to take precious time facilitating Morgenthau’s
rescue efforts while there were more pressing, reasonable issues at hand. 143
Stimson worried about Morgenthau’s level of emotional involvement in the
refugee issue as well. But, it was not only Morgenthau who seemed not to measure up to
the old ideal. Welles too, was young. He was also homosexual. He was a bit of a dandy,
a “Dapper Dan,” to use the terminology of the day. He was even a favorite of the
detested Drew Pearson! What could be further from the old assumptions of a restrained,
dignified political masculinity, shored up by age and tradition and experience? Hull
couldn’t stand Welles most of the time. Stimson summed up the situation, “Hull and
Welles are not always on speaking terms … [and it puts me] in a devil of a position.”
However, Morgenthau liked Welles a great deal. The Jewish New-Dealer and the gay
global strategist both embodied a very real “changing of the guard.” They were the face
of the future, and what a remarkable departure it must have appeared to Stimson and
Hull! The old was on its way out, and the new was already firmly established. Tradition
was giving way to liberal innovation that frightened the traditionalists. One particular
headline after Hull’s resignation symbolized the spirit of the times. After Hull stepped
down in 1944, despite his notoriously difficult relationship with the press, the papers
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almost universally praised him; he had become an American institution. The headlines
hailed Hull: “Best Negotiator since Franklin,” “The Father of the United Nations,”
“Cordell Hull, Sound and Solid,” and “Simple American Sincerity was Creed of
Secretary Hull.” But in December of 1944, came the headline that probably cut deeply
into the heart of cabinet divisions. One editorial in Life magazine was headlined: MR.
HULL: HIS CAREER WAS IN A GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION, BUT A GREATER
ONE IS NEEDED NOW. Of course Morgenthau and Welles had annoyed Hull; in a
sense, they were rendering him obsolete. The world was rapidly changing, and the
success of men like Morgenthau meant that men Hull—and his world—despite all of his
magnificent accomplishments and experience, might be slipping into the annals of the
past. 144

CONCLUSION TO PART TWO

What did all of this mean for Morgenthau’s activist dreams for European
refugees? It mattered a great deal. Morgenthau was not simply another link in the
bureaucratic chain, working on an ordinary policy in an ordinary time. Both Morgenthau
and activist refugee work represented a radical departure from accepted traditions that
many people simply were unprepared to accept. The world was changing, and there was
a battle raging over what the future of the Cabinet would look like. The casualties were
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usually confined to hurt feelings, devalued traditions, and stacks of paper. Unfortunately,
there were human casualties as well. Every piece of red tape, every “lost” telegram,
every effort that simply was not made had a human cost. There were certainly great
obstacles, both tangible and ephemeral. The red tape could be cut with effort, but the
immovable obstacles in the minds of the men around him were the most difficult to
overcome.
There were worlds beneath the surface. First, FDR’s administrative style of
competitive adhocracy and overlapping jurisdictions created a nightmare of competition
and suspicion that made any positive action difficult to achieve without a great deal of
bureaucratic squabbling. On the next level, institutional cultures within the cabinet were
a strong undertow that flowed against Morgenthau’s efforts—the State Department’s
paranoid fear of Communism and radicals and nearly everything else was quite a force to
be reckoned with. Finally, interpersonal dynamics further complicated Morgenthau’s
rescue efforts, as intergenerational tensions changed the way he was perceived and by
extension what his options became.
The Talmud says, “We do not see the world as it is, we see the world as we are.”
For Morgenthau and activism on behalf of refugees from the Holocaust, this certainly
was true. Henry Stimson, Cordell Hull, and State Department Bureaucrats saw
Morgenthau not as he was, but as they were, and this had profound implications.
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General Conclusion

Certainly, Henry Morgenthau had a difficult job in a difficult time, but he worked
at it with a dogged determination. He was far from perfect, and he was certainly an
unlikely activist; in his heart, Morgenthau was a quiet man who probably would have
preferred to remain in the background managing the money. Initially, Morgenthau was
consumed with financing the war, but he had been actively interested in finding solutions
for refugees from the very beginning. As he gradually realized that the State Department
was shirking its duty and failing the people who most desperately needed its help, his
conscience projected him forward, and Morgenthau broke with tradition, stepped into the
fray, got his hands dirty, and helped.
The historians have often relegated Morgenthau to the sidelines, and only
discussed him in reference to the Treasury and economics, the Creation of the War
Refugee Board, or the Morgenthau Plan. To do so is to lose a great deal of historical
complexity surrounding the complicated evolution of one American activist whose path
was characterized by contingency. It did not have to happen as it did, but Morgenthau’s
story unfolded in a way that illuminated a great deal about the institutional world in
which he operated.
There were certainly obstacles along his path. Resistance from the State
Department, the Administrative style of FDR, and the intergenerational tension between
competing value systems all complicated the matter. Indeed, the worlds of expectations
and assumptions within each of us limit and define more than we care to admit. But,
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despite all this, Morgenthau was determined to help refugees from the Holocaust.
Because he knew that human lives were at stake, he pressed on, and helped save many
people from the Holocaust. His activism came earlier than many historians have
supposed, and was also contingent upon a great deal of factors inside the cabinet and
inside the minds of the actors involved. Morgenthau certainly deserves more attention
from historians as his story concerned much more than historical minutiae. In its largest
context, Morgenthau’s activism on behalf of European refugees substantiates the hope
that one person, however unfit he or she may appear to others, can accomplish a great
deal and ultimately impact the course of history.
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